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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the cyclical nature of conflict in Afghanistan and the elusive 
condition of stability as coalition forces begin their anticipated drawdown in 2011, and 
complete transition of security to Afghan forces in 2014.  Assuming that the basic 
societal elements of stability require a balancing of political, economic, and security 
structures to form a sense of national cohesion, this study seeks to determine if national 
cohesion is sufficient enough to break the cycle of conflict; and if so, what strategy with 
neighboring countries will foster this cohesion in order to disrupt the cycle of conflict?  A 
regional approach is necessary to buttress any internal strategies attempted within 
Afghanistan; but to do so, the alliance of partner nations must first begin small and then 
grow from a strong central core. The core players in the region are Iran, India, and 
Pakistan, but the nature of their self-interested interactions has proven unprofitable and 
unsustainable in the long-term.  To the degree that these countries can be assisted to 
move beyond their pursuance of self-interests, to form a cooperative regional alliance, 
then the goal of regional stability, as well as stability in Afghanistan, can become a 
reality. 
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While much energy has been dedicated towards planning and executing a 
successful internal strategy for Afghan stability, this alone is not sufficient to ensure 
success beyond 2014.  In addition to internal efforts, it is essential to look forward and 
beyond Afghanistan, and examine the broader effects of external actors on Afghan 
security and stability.  External influences from neighboring countries as well as 
international super powers have always been at the forefront, and arguably in some cases 
the root of strife in Afghanistan.  These interactions are so extensive that the sequence 
they follow seems to take on a cyclical nature over time.  Historically, the process begins 
with external interferences that disrupt Afghanistan’s internal balance of power; this in 
turn creates unrest and conflict both in and amongst internal factions, and eventually 
against the external actors themselves.  Once this conflict peaks, external interest wanes, 
forces withdraw, and Afghan affairs are left to their own devices until again, external 
powers and interests are heightened, which inevitably disrupt the internal balance and the 
cycle of conflict resumes.  This pattern can be seen in varying degrees throughout 
Afghanistan’s storied history: from before and including the Anglo-Afghan Wars of the 
19th century, to the communist interventions of the 20th century, to the current NATO 
operations of the past decade. 
After more than nine years, conflict appears to be peaking in Afghanistan, after 
which external interest and activity will inevitably decline. This is a good thing as long as 
something is done to first resolve external interests.  If nothing is done to rectify external 
concerns and interests then any resolutions found in the current conflict will surely be 
temporary.  As international appetite for conflict in Afghanistan wanes, the question 
regarding what can be done to politically and socially strengthen Afghanistan, while 
simultaneously resolving the security and economic concerns of external actors, must be 
addressed.  As discussions increasingly focus on the 2011 drawdown of surge forces and 
the 2014 transition to Afghan security forces, headway must be made in the context of 
Afghanistan’s external neighbors and partners, or all parties put at risk the internal 
progress made and possibly force another tragic repeat of the Afghan cycle of conflict. 
 2
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify acceptable and sustainable measures that 
will reduce external interference in Afghan affairs and allow the formation of national 
cohesion.  The breadth and depth of the Afghan conflict and all its inter-related problems 
are so profound that simply listing all the challenges that make progress difficult fails to 
truly illuminate the best way forward.1 What the process now requires is more 
constructive focus on areas of improvement that are viable so that incremental 
development may continue and ultimately provide forward movement.  This can be 
derived from a range of possible outcomes, to the degree that they are acceptable to 
Afghans and the consortium of regional and extra-regional countries that have an interest 
in the future of Afghanistan.   
The scope of this qualitative and longitudinal research will include analysis of the 
insufficiency of internal solutions alone, and the essential requirement for external 
interactions at the regional and international level.  In addition to the analysis of the 
influence of regional actors, the authors will also describe how potentially fragile stability 
may be while trying to break the repeating cycle of conflict. 
The nature of The Great Game in Afghanistan has transformed with the addition 
of economic giants like the United States, China, and India.  Although the rich history of 
external influence and internal power struggles greatly colors the history of Afghanistan, 
these pre-21st century periods will only receive minor analysis. Notwithstanding the 
importance of a historical perspective, the greater scope of this thesis will focus on the 
current state of affairs, since the prospect of future stability must start from this particular 
point in the cycle.  During this research, the authors will identify how the social network 
in Afghanistan supports the interwoven political, economic and security structures, and 
how proper balance can improve overall security and stability in Afghanistan by 
adjusting the external dynamics of bordering and interested states. 
                                                 
1 Ashley J. Tellis, Aroop Mukharji, and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Is a Regional Strategy Viable in 
Afghanistan? (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 115. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
Growing sentiment indicates that current conditions in Afghanistan are 
unsustainable, and the country is taking on a “Vietnam Syndrome” in American military 
and public discussions.2 This is true to the degree that, like Vietnam, U.S. public opinion 
in support of the war in Afghanistan appears to be waning, and after more than nine years 
economic, political, and military resources are quickly being drained.  Inevitably, some 
form of military drawdown is imperative and so the question exists:  what effects will a 
military drawdown have on the stability of Afghanistan, much less the region?  Much has 
been written regarding the current counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that is being 
implemented in Afghanistan, and clearly the success or failure of this COIN strategy will 
influence stability in the short term.  However, in order to establish a stable condition that 
is sustainable, changes to the external conditions that surround Afghanistan must occur. 
In a broader sense, if there is widespread popular support for the Taliban, the 
Kabul government will find itself on a collision course with its own citizens.  It is, 
therefore, essential to build a sustainable grassroots political relationship with the Afghan 
people that can develop beyond COIN and into a persistent long-term solution for 
Afghanistan.  
In general terms, it is clear that the many different strategies that have been 
employed in Afghanistan have not achieved the desired levels of security and stability 
originally hoped for or intended.  Previously, ISAF (International Security Assistance 
Force) success was measured by the number of insurgents killed or the number of 
operations conducted, which was a quantifiable measure that showed perceived success.3 
Yet, the insurgents still seem to operate with growing impunity at the time and place of  
 
 
                                                 
2 Sunil Ram, “Afghanistan, America, and the ‘Vietnam’ Syndrome,” Global Research, April 18, 2010, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18710 (accessed on 04/03/ 2011). 
3 “Viewpoint: Measuring Success in Afghanistan,” BBC, February 22, 2010, sec. South Asia, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8524137.stm (accessed on 04/05/2011); and ISAF Public Affairs 
Office, “Insurgent Morale Low in Face of Security Ops,” August 25, 2010, 
http://www.centcom.mil/news/insurgent-morale-low-in-face-of-security-ops (accessed on 04/05/2011). 
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their choosing. According to David Kilcullen, “Historically, the more military pressure is 
put on a fragmented society like Afghanistan, the more a coalition against the invader 
becomes the likely outcome.”4 
The Karzai government remains weak, corrupt, and ineffective, and by far, this is 
the Taliban’s best talking point.  Currently, the Afghan government that must win this 
war—if it is to be won—has not grown in capacity commensurate with the amount of 
money and efforts dedicated to this purpose.  Elements of Southern Pashtun tribes 
perceive that they are underrepresented and appear disaffected with the central 
government. Such disaffection from the largest and traditionally most powerful of 
Afghanistan’s ethnic groups will have immensely destabilizing implications for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan if left unattended.  The Taliban remain a resilient enemy who, 
after more than nine years of conflict, has not been defeated.  Karzai and the Coalition are 
now talking about “good” and “bad” Taliban and even holding direct discussions with the 
good group.  This would seem an effort to either co-opt more amenable elements or split 
the group into more factions.  Ultimately this strategy is one that may result in a power-
sharing arrangement in Kabul. Such an approach is just the beginning, but this could 
drastically change the dynamics of the conflict and its potential resolution.  
Afghanistan is located at the tri-junction of three strategic regions of South Asia, 
Southwest Asia and Central Asia, and a position that raises its importance in the eyes of 
its neighbors and because of its own fragility makes it vulnerable to their influence.  A 
regional balance of power and threat perception have played an important role in defining 
Afghanistan’s political structure.  Since the intervention of the former Soviet Union in 
1979, the factors of regional and international politics have added new and important 
dimensions to the country’s internal politics.  With globalization and the increased reach 
of non-state actors, this region is likely to become even more vulnerable. The border 
separating Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east is largely irrelevant to the people that live 
there, as life is seen as no different from one side to the other.  For this reason, often 
                                                 
4 Gilles Dorronsoro, Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War (Washington, D.C: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2009), 9, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_war-strategy.pdf (accessed on 04/22/2011). 
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Pashtun discontent in Afghanistan can easily spill over to the same socially connected 
populations in northern Pakistan.  Since the problem of loose borders is endemic 
throughout the region, the solutions to the Afghan problems require regional involvement 
in a coordinated and collaborative arrangement as never before envisioned or attempted. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis poses two questions in regard to the future environment in Afghanistan 
after a major withdrawal of coalition military forces.  Assuming that the basic societal 
elements of stability require a balancing of political, economic, and security structures, is 
national cohesion sufficient to break the cycle of conflict?  Additionally, the authors 
assume that stability in Afghanistan will surely require something different from Western 
models of governance.  Based on the cultural characteristics of the Afghan society, the 
authors assume the specific formula for stability will be unique to Afghanistan, even 
when compared to other developing nations.5 The second question focuses more 
specifically on the long-term external environment:  what strategy for stability with 
neighboring countries is necessary to foster national cohesion and disrupt the cycle of 
conflict?  The authors will analyze the conditions that have led to stability in Afghanistan 
in the past, and focus on how to derive acceptable and sustainable stability for the future 
in light of the last decade of conflict.   
Thorough analysis of these questions will provide context and focus to coalition 
efforts to foster long-term stability in Afghanistan.  To the degree that they are relational, 
resolutions in Afghanistan may have application to other multi-player regional stability 
problems.  At a minimum, this study seeks to illuminate the conditions necessary to 
stabilize the region as a whole. 
                                                 
5 Malou Innocent and Ted Galen Carpenter, Escaping the “Graveyard of Empires:” A Strategy to Exit 
Afghanistan (Washington D.C.: Cato Institute, 2009), 10, http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-
graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf (accessed on 02/20/2011). 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
The authors will use a combination of methods to analyze the question of stability 
in Afghanistan in a post-drawdown environment.  First, they will use a form of 
longitudinal analysis to investigate the conditions relative to other instances of foreign 
intervention in Afghanistan. Within this analysis, they will define and discuss different 
forms of interventions6 and how these interventions have created instability. Second, they 
will draw from the empirical evidence that addresses the Afghan conditions both past and 
current. Finally, the authors will use game theory to demonstrate various status quo 
strategies that underlie efforts for lasting stability and peace in Afghanistan. 
The path diagram in Figure 1 describes the causal mechanisms with regard to the 
first question posed by this thesis—national cohesion alone is necessary but not sufficient 
to break the cycle of conflict and stabilize Afghanistan for the long term. 
                                                 
6 Joseph S. Nye and David A. Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An 
Introduction to Theory and History, vol. 8 (Boston u.a.: Longman, 2011), 197. 
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Figure 1.   Path Diagram Regarding Internal Dynamics in Afghanistan 
Historically, Afghanistan included Pakistan’s northwestern Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), so when Afghan culture and traditions are discussed, 
they are the same as that being practiced in FATA and to some degree the larger part of 
Pakistan’s Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces. These people are basically from the 
same tribes and follow the same traditions. The majority of the region’s inhabitants are 
from Pashtun tribes; fifteen million live in Afghanistan and almost thirty million live on 
the other side of the Durand line in Pakistan.7  
                                                 
7 “The World Factbook - Afghanistan,” cia.gov, April 25, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed on 05/05/2011).  
According to the CIA fact book, Pashtuns are the majority ethnic community in Afghanistan that forms 
almost forty-two percent of the total population.  Fifteen million Pashtuns are living in Afghanistan and 
another thirty million in the neighboring Pakistan. 
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A general struggle against foreign occupation has always been a strong factor of 
unity and cohesion amongst these tribes.  Therefore, the presence of occupiers can often 
serve to unite this society, which provides a common cause for insurgency. Also, because 
of the strong cultural and religious tenets of honorably living through “Jihad” and the 
respectable way of dying through “Shahadat,” many Afghans embrace insurgency as a 
societal obligation.  Drawing stronger links between the political, economic, security and 
social factors is necessary to create a degree of internal stability, which is essential to 
create a form of national cohesion that has been fractured over the past thirty years of 
conflict.  However, national cohesion, while necessary to strengthen the country 
internally, will not be sufficient to change the external environment that has weakened 
Afghanistan.  Left unchanged, the external conditions of competing regional and 
international interests will easily re-fracture the fragile stability that may be present by 
the 2014 transition goal. 
The second question this thesis poses addresses the complicated external 
dynamics that shape the nature of stability in Afghanistan.  Coalition forces in 
Afghanistan have begun to recognize the breadth of the regional dynamics as evidenced 
in their increased attempts to synchronize international efforts beyond just Afghanistan.  
This has been a slowly developing realization, but one that will eventually play a 
singularly crucial role in post drawdown stability.  If internal Afghan conditions are seen 
as beneficial to the majority of neighboring countries, then coalescing their disparate 
interests into a form of cooperation will make long-term stability feasible.  The path 
diagram in Figure 2 shows how the ‘iceberg’ of Afghanistan, when surrounded by the 
turbulent combination of regional actors, is nearly overcome by external influences and 
accordingly, internal stability is threatened.  However, if the structural environment in 
which these countries interact and influence the iceberg were to change such that the 
environment became more buoyant to the iceberg, then this change may be sufficient to 
allow Afghanistan to stabilize in a more long-term manner. 
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Figure 2.   Path Diagram Regarding External Dynamics and Regional Rivalries 
Changing this environment of regional and global actors is such a daunting idea 
that it is emblematic of the comparable feat of changing the buoyant characteristics of the 
water that surrounds the iceberg.  Regardless, if the iceberg is to be stabilized, then the 
external conditions must be changed because the external status quo will doom the 
iceberg no matter how buoyant it is.  From another perspective, repeated interventions 
have fractured the Afghanistan society from within and widened the gap of ungoverned 
regions.  If an egg breaks due to external force, inside life ends; but if it breaks from 
inside life has begun.   
Finally, while analyzing the game theory approach between the regional players 





specifically, how regional players are employing both defensive and offensive realism, 
along with balancing and buck passing, to address their security concerns in 
Afghanistan.8 
 
Figure 3.   Current Situation and Proposed Plan towards Stability in Afghanistan  
As shown in the figure, during the authors’ research they will determine that 
through better regional understanding and political/economic cooperation there can be a 
movement towards stability in Afghanistan and the status quo can be broken. 
International efforts in Afghanistan have largely been operating on the left side of the red 
arrow since 2001, but with increasing urgency, the strategy in Afghanistan needs to shift 
towards the right side and focus on regional understanding and alliances that strengthen 
both political and economic cooperation. 
                                                 
8 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 153; 
Joseph S. Nye and David A. Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to 
Theory and History, 197; and T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann, Balance of Power: Theory 
and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 384. 
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E. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II will look at literature on stabilization and state building. In this chapter, 
the author contends that state building is not enough to achieve stability in Afghanistan. 
The author will also detail the general efforts of the past ten years and critically analyze 
how these measures are necessary but insufficient in creating long-term stability in 
Afghanistan.  The effects of conflict in the last thirty years have been so extreme that the 
country has been severely fractured.  State building and democracy have the potential to 
repair these fissures, but ultimately will be insufficient to stem the tide of the Afghan 
cycle of conflict without other drastic efforts in the region. 
Chapter III will show the necessity and sufficiency of a regional approach to 
ultimately break the cycle of conflict. Moreover, this chapter will address the regional 
core players (RCPs) and the core controversial issues in Afghanistan that create mutual 
rivalry. A theoretical game approach regarding Afghanistan will further substantiate the 
complex rivalries between RCPs and the effect of external interference on regional 
balance of power.  . 
In Chapter IV, the author will address the other relevant players in the region who 
have the ability to influence the core players along with the government and tribes inside 
Afghanistan. This chapter will also focus on different common issues in Afghanistan that 
can converge the interests of all regional players and make them stakeholders in 
Afghanistan. 
In Chapter V, the authors will develop a framework for an alliance among the 
regional players.  This will support the external approach but also show how the ultimate 
resolution to support one another will be mutually beneficial, as opposed to the current 
conditions in which all nations involved are losing in this “new great game.”  
Chapter VI will provide some recommendations and discuss ‘shocks’ to show 
how vulnerable any regional cooperation would be to sustaining peace in Afghanistan. 
The thesis will conclude with a look at the transition timeline of 2014 and analyze the 
necessary requirements to strengthen stability both internally and externally in order to 
meet this goal.  This chapter will also discuss the ramifications if changes are insufficient 
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to create long-term stability and how things could proceed if the process remains 
intransient.  This analysis should be helpful in preparing policy makers for potential 
second- and third-order effects when considering long-term policies and strategies in the 
region. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Politicians and military commanders have different perceptions and solutions for 
Afghanistan’s problems.  However, most of them agree on four fundamental aspects 
likely to influence post-drawdown stability in Afghanistan: stability requires a legitimate 
state, capable security forces, a regional balance of power, and the ability to satisfy the 
security interests of global partners.  The first two of these four factors have been the 
focus of intense international efforts, but without a functional change in the way all actors 
approach the idea of a regional balance of power and the security interests of global 
partners, internal gains in Afghanistan will be short lived.  The prescribed solution of 
alliances, in this region in particular, is one of the most challenging, but an essential 
necessity if a resilient and stable Afghanistan is to rise out of the decades of conflict and 
enter a new era of peace and stability.  Afghanistan needs to be stable and strong from the 
inside to overcome the negative effects of repeated external interventions and influence. 
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II. LOOKING BEYOND INTERNAL STABILITY 
Regardless of the ideological, political, or economic reasons for 
overthrowing a foreign government, putting into place a system that 
ensures durable large-coalition rule is unlikely.9 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Tribal culture has always been dominant in Afghan society.  For centuries the 
tribes have been independent, autonomous and generally resisted foreign occupation, but 
more specifically they have rejected the legitimacy of foreign-influenced governments in 
Afghanistan.   
For various reasons, Afghanistan has been a focal point of different civilizations 
and while it has never sought foreigners on its land, it has repeatedly attracted foreign 
occupation.  Historically, controlling Afghanistan from outside its geographical borders 
has been a more viable and pragmatic strategy than occupying this graveyard of empires. 
The British attempted twice in the 19th century to gain control over this piece of land, but 
soon withdrew to establish it as a buffer zone while maintaining external influence to 
resist Russian expansion.  In the 20th century, repeated interventions (as shown in Figure 
4) and experimentations in Afghanistan have made a cocktail of the Afghan social 
structure, which is now more bifurcated and fractured, and ultimately harmed those who 
used, misused and interfered in the region.  Today, the credibility of Western-led nation-
building is jeopardized because it is seen to deny justice to the very people it was 
supposed to help.  According to Afghan expert Ahmed Rashid, “It could well be argued 
that over time Islamic extremists were emboldened rather than subdued by the travesty of 
justice the United States perpetrated. The people learn to hate America.”10 
                                                 
9 Hilton L. Root, Alliance Curse:  How America Lost the Third World (Washington, D.C: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2008), 28. 
10 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 
Central Asia, Revised (Penguin, 2009), 294. 
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Figure 4.   Foreign Interventions in Afghanistan in the Last Hundred Years 
B. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
From the founding of the Durrani dynasty in 1747 until 1838, Afghan rulers had 
only close relatives as rivals.  Tribes in different parts of Afghanistan have been 
distributed throughout various population centers, and have neither been very mobile nor 
very interested in dynasty politics.  Traditionally, none of the central governments 
interfered with the tribal, traditional way of living.  With the growing interference and 
threat between Russia and Britain during the Great Game, Afghan rulers encouraged 
tribes to take up arms against their occupiers.  During the first and second Anglo- Afghan 
wars, the tribesmen of Afghanistan, organized by the central Afghan government, 
defeated the British Army.  According to Afghan expert Thomas Barfield,  
Foreign interferences during the British-Afghan wars drew Afghan tribesmen 
increasingly towards guns and money.  With each succeeding crises and popular military 
mobilization, the restoration of state authority became harder and disputes over who has 
the right to rule the state became fiercer.11  Later, political dynamics considerably 
changed after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.   
The death of King Daoud after the Soviet coup brought an end to the monarch 
rule in Afghanistan.  Unfortunately, the continued struggle against the Soviet occupation 
to make Afghanistan ungovernable for the Soviets also resulted in the demise of the 
                                                 
11 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton University Press, 2010), 
2. 
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fragile, legitimate political infrastructure in Afghanistan.  Religious groups and drug 
warlords became even more powerful after the Soviet withdrawal.  While Islam had 
always been a way of life in Afghanistan, the religious war against the Russian invasion 
gave further impetus to radicals and extremists.  After the Soviet withdrawal and 
subsequent fall of the communist-backed government, the remaining Afghan state 
infrastructure was so fractured that it had lost all trust in the eyes of the population. 
C. CONCEPT OF A STABLE STATE IN AFGHANISTAN 
There is no memorable set pattern of stable governance built into the current 
generation’s psyche in Afghanistan.  Looking further back, the concept of a stable state in 
the political history of Afghanistan has been one where the state, or the central 
government, rarely interfered with the tribal elders, elites and Maliks. 
After the short reign of Nadir Shah his son, Ahmed Shah Durrani, founded the 
Durrani Empire in 1747.  The Durrani Empire maintained a relative stable period of 
governance and authority over the country for twenty-five years.  During this period and 
the various changes in the central government that ensued over the next almost two 
hundred years, three factors were predominantly visible for maintaining stable rule in 
Afghanistan:  first, a decentralized method of governance; second, absence of 
interference by external players; and finally, strict implementation of the law through the 
Jirga or Shura system. While there existed some level of conflict in the deposing and 
changing of central leadership during this period, this conflict did not spread throughout 
the whole country.  Only when one of the above three conditions was violated did 
widespread conflict ensue. The only prolonged exception to this was the era of Amir 
Abdul Rehman (1880-1901), which marked the beginning evolution of a cycle of conflict 
involving external players in which internal balances began to be realigned. 
D. STABILITY THROUGH COERCION:  AMIR ABDUL REHMAN (1880–
1901) 
The Iron Amir, as he was later known for his tough measures against opponents 
and countering revolt through force, was an exception to the cycle of conflict in that he 
 16
lasted more than twenty years.  However, in the end this adaptation of foreign-supported 
rule was unsustainable much like the popular Middle East unrest that began deposing 
longstanding dictators in the beginning of 2011.  In other words, the cycle of conflict in 
Afghanistan continued, it just took longer to overcome the illegitimate rule of the Iron 
Amir.  Amir Abdul Rehman was able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population 
initially because of his ability to provide security and stability in Afghanistan.  He raised 
a strong security force and instituted strict laws to ensure central authoritative rule.  Due 
to his political sagacity he was able to maintain firm control of his territory while 
implementing major reforms. His ability to keep the major powers outside of Afghan 
territory provided legitimacy and credibility to his central and strict form of government.  
He mercilessly executed elements of the non-Pashtun population in the north and 
northwest provinces of Afghanistan and favored Pashtuns to gain control of those areas.  
While Rehman was supported by the British, his strong Pashtun nationalism along with 
his religious dispensation of justice made him acceptable in the eyes of population for a 
time.  It was basically Amir Abdur Rehman who destroyed the historic political structure 
and deprived different regions of political and economic autonomy by creating a strong 
central government.12 Eventually, this strong approach was viewed as an extension of 
British meddling and, while not directly administered, Rehman and external influence 
became synonymous to the extent that he was eventually deposed from within and the 
cycle of conflict began again. 
E. STABILITY THROUGH COMPROMISE:  NADIR SHAH AND ZAHIR 
SHAH, AFGHANISTAN (1929–1978) 
During the era of Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah (1929–1978), Afghanistan saw a 
considerable period of peace and relative noninterference.  The country maintained 
peaceful relations with its neighbors with no existential threat from any regional powers. 
Afghanistan was relatively stable for almost fifty-five years, avoiding any internal 
rebellion and foreign intervention. Today, that period of peace for five decades is  
 
                                                 
12 Barfield, Afghanistan, 2. 
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considered to be the golden age in Afghanistan politics. Thereafter, the decade of the ‘70s 
was full of coups, war and rebellion.  After the communist coup and Russian invasion, 
Afghanistan became a battleground and a zone of never-ending conflict.  
F. DEFEAT OF THE USSR AND RISE OF THE TALIBAN 
Within months of the 1979 Soviet occupation, Afghanistan became a focal point 
for the Cold War between the Soviet Union and United States. The Mujahedeen emerged 
as the main fighting force against the Soviet Army.  However, for the Afghans the Soviet 
invasion was another opportunity to pursue their cultural art of guerilla warfare under the 
name of Jihad and the fight for freedom.  One cannot assume that Afghans fought foreign 
intervention solely because of the financial benefits the conflict might bring.  The loss of 
life, property, and human suffering far outweighed any development or aid these conflicts 
transferred, but the resilient Afghan people did find a way to survive and the currency 
during these times became guns and violence, which engendered power and money.  This 
was a significant change from the traditional power structure that previous social norms 
relied on through the tribal hierarchy.  From this conflict, which claimed 1.5 million 
Afghan lives and ended after Soviet support for the puppet government collapsed, 
emerged a second generation of Mujahedeen, who later called themselves “Taliban.”13 
According to Ahmed Rashid, “Amir Abdur Rehman’s policy of empowering Islamic 
Mullahs and his revolts against non-Pashtun population were a few of the influencing 
factors on Taliban during their rise to power and their way of Governance.”14  
The Taliban phenomenon was a natural product of infighting amongst Afghan 
factions after the Russian collapse.  In the 1990s, The Taliban emerged from among the 
young and energetic Pashtuns–mainly nurtured and groomed during the decade of war 
against Russia and indoctrinated with a strong spirit of Jihad and Islamic code of conduct.  
                                                 
13 The meaning of “Taliban” is student. These were mainly young students from the Madrassas, which 
were raised during the Soviet War and funded by Saudis and Americans through Pakistan’s Inter-services 
Intelligence (ISI) agency.  The majority of Taliban are Pashtuns, an ethnic majority in Afghanistan.  
Approximately fifteen million Pashtuns live in Afghanistan and thirty million are on the other side of the 
Durand line in Pakistan. Most of them are interconnected and support each other socially, economically, 
and politically. 
14 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2002), 281.  
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During the Afghan civil war (1989–1995), many youth became disillusioned and 
dismayed by the corrupt and incompetent Afghan warlords.  Following the civil war, 
none of the ruling factions in Afghanistan was competent enough to live up to the 
expectation of the Afghan people who had sacrificed for ten years to resist the Russian 
invasion in addition to civil strife.  The Taliban provided hope for change and stability 
during that time of chaos and confusion.  Unfortunately for the Taliban, they too allowed 
external influences to manipulate their fledgling system.  Pakistani support was a major 
factor in strengthening the Taliban initially, but it also drew the ire and violent resistance 
from the Northern Alliance, who was in turn supported by other neighbors such as Iran 
and other Central Asian Republics.  This arrangement of foreign sponsorship perpetuated 
the continued conflict and instability.   
To make the situation even more convoluted, the Taliban invited a fundamentalist 
organization into the country, and ultimately this relationship with Al Qaeda would be its 
undoing.  Over time it is possible that “Afghanistan [could] have reverted to its 
traditional but stable state had the Taliban administration in Kabul not granted sanctuary 
to Al-Qaeda.”15 However, even this is debatable because of the persistent conflict that 
external interference from the regional and international actors seemed to foment.  
Regardless, the crescendo of extra-national activity hit a peak on September and 
Afghanistan descended back into the cycle of conflict. 
G. AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN 
U.S. Major General Michael Flynn, deputy chief of staff for intelligence in 
Afghanistan, made a bold claim in 2010 when he stated, "eight years into the war in 
Afghanistan… the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions 
about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to 
persuade."16  This is also a telling statement considering how things began in 2001, 
following the World Trade Center attacks.   
                                                 
15 Shahid Javed Burki, “AFPAK Policy a Mistake,” November 17, 2009, 
http://cspasif.blogspot.com/2009/11/afpak-policy-mistake-by-shahid-javed.html (accessed on 01/28/2011).  
16 Bernd Debusmann, “American Intelligence and Fortune-Telling,” January 7, 2010, 
http://www.cnas.org/node/3956 (accessed on 03/02/2011). 
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Since 9/11, the United States has done much to change the balance of power in 
Afghanistan.  The war against Al-Qaeda morphed into a war against the Taliban, and 
some contend that it has now snowballed into a broader regional proxy war.  There have 
been phenomenal efforts in the last nine years to counter the Taliban insurgency and 
ensure that they never regain power.17 While a vast international alliance exists to 
counter the Taliban insurgency and attempt to expand the capacity of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, there are questions that remain regarding the actions of the 
regional players and their conflicting interests, which have yet to be resolved.  Most 
significantly, the revamped COIN strategy that took root in 2008 has remained only 
tepidly successful in addressing the expectations of the population, or what David Galula 
refers to as “population survival strategy.” Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen 
argues:   
The population wants predictability, order and safety and that safety comes from 
knowing where you stand and knowing that if you do this or do not do this, following the 
rules, you will be safe. Even if they do not like Hezbollah or the Taliban in particular, 
they still feel safer living within the set rules. So, creation of safety, it is a lot about 
predictability, consistency, and reliability.18 
The perception exists that the international efforts of the last decade in 
Afghanistan have been somewhat futile, and coalition efforts are rife with inconsistencies 
in strategy.  In terms of futility, one could reference the investment of more than $500 
billion to build up internal security in Afghanistan over the last nine years through a  
 
                                                 
17 Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 
9/11 (Congressional Research Service, September 2, 2010), 26, http://www.netadvisor.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/2010-09-02-Cost-Iraq-Afgan-Global-Terror-57-pps-FAS.pdf (accessed on 
04/13/2011).  Average monthly obligations for Afghanistan hovered around $1 billion from FY2003 
through FY2005 with average troop strength growing from 10,400 to 19,100. Obligations doubled from 
$1.5 billion in FY2006 to $3.1 billion in FY2008 as average troop strength grew from about 20,000 to 
30,000. Between FY2008 and FY2009, average monthly obligations increased threefold from $1.3 billion 
to $4.4 billion while average strength more than doubled from about 20,000 in FY2008 to 51,000 in 
FY2009. 
18 Octavian Manea, “Interview with Dr. David Kilcullen,” (Small Wars Journal, November 7, 2010), 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/597-manea.pdf (accessed on 01/18/2011). 
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strong Afghan Security Force (ASF).19  Despite this incredible focus on security over 
comparable investment in infrastructure, for example, insurgent activity and the level of 
violence have only increased as the conflict has dragged on.   
 
Figure 5.   Graph of American Investment in Afghanistan 
 
 
Figure 6.   Number of Insurgent Attacks and Type by Week, January 2004-Current20 
During President Obama’s Afghanistan review in 2008, there were debates over 
how to measure success, and there has been a shift when comparing current strategies, 
with the evolving objectives of the Bush administration.  Vice President Joe Biden was of 
the opinion that, “our strategy in Afghanistan should not focus on state building and 
                                                 
19 Manea, “Interview with Dr. David Kilcullen.”  
20 Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera, and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index Tracking 
Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan (Brookings Institution, March 29, 2011), 
10, http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx (accessed on 04/17/2011). 
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eliminating Taliban,”21 though that is essentially what the United States is doing.  While 
the change in strategies was prudent and necessary, regional actors nonetheless see the 
stagnated security conditions and evolving strategies, and act according to their perceived 
best interest.  These Actions often conflict with U.S. strategies, and even hamper regional 
progress, which in turn exacerbates internal efforts.  Here again the cycle of conflict 
seems to only gain speed and grow in stature. 
H. ANALYSIS 
Considering all Afghan eras mentioned previously, the most evident conclusion is 
that political, economic and military institutions have never been strong or particularly 
resilient in Afghanistan.  Second, foreign interference is an integral factor that has 
repeatedly been a source of instability and turmoil in Afghanistan.  Whether considering 
the British conquests of the 19th century, the Soviet invasion of the 20th century, or the 
U.S. attack in the 21st century, the conflicts always involve an effort to pacify the local 
populace regardless of the initial reasons for the conflict.  Foreign influence creates a 
problem of sovereign legitimacy that eventually fractures whatever tentative peace or 
stability may exist.  Historian Hilton Root argues:   
When leadership in the weaker country depends for legitimacy on the foreign 
benefactor for resources such as foreign aid, abundant credit, and military assistance, the 
government can neglect building its own predictable system of laws, policy, procedural 
transparency, and political accountability.22 
This truth is especially prevalent in the case of Afghanistan in terms of its 
political, economic, and security conditions during foreign interventions. 
                                                 
21 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 309. 
22 Root, Alliance Curse, 5. 
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Table 1.   Evaluation of Afghan Regimes from 19th Century to Present 
State power in Afghanistan has periodically collapsed due to armed conflicts and 
weak political authority, and the addition of foreign interference and interests have 
greatly compounded the levels of social disruption and use of force within the system as a 
whole.  The cycle of conflict had run its course and evolved to such an extent over the 
years that when the Soviets withdrew, guns and money were readily available to all the 
ethnic groups.  This created an increasingly dangerous dynamic that seemed to raise the 
ferocity of internal conflict with each generation of the cycle.  Afghanistan after 1988 
became a stage for a series of proxy wars between the neighboring states.  Barfield 
contends, “As a consequence, the seemingly all-powerful centralized state that held 
Afghanistan in its thrall in 1901 was reduced to a powerless shell by 2001.”23  This meant 
that the regeneration of internal stability on its own was almost unthinkable because the 
infrastructure needed to nurture the state had disintegrated after years of conflict. 
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I. ROOTS OF INSTABILITY:  WEAK STATE CRAFT OR FOREIGN 
INTERFERENCE? 
Since the 19th century, there has been a mix of centralized and decentralized 
models of governance in Afghanistan, including dynasties and authoritarian rule.  
However, generally those rulers who managed to avoid foreign interference and influence 
were able to gain legitimacy and ensure a level of stability in Afghanistan.  There is no 
specific model of governance that can be considered successful for Afghanistan, though 
each has had their own inherent strengths relative to the social environment of the 
country at that time. While authentic data regarding the expectations of the population in 
Afghanistan is limited, one factor that has been consistent is the fact that the Afghan 
population, no matter how fractious, is always united against the perceived threat of 
occupation. Afghanis have an admirably strong sense of prestige and ego that glue them 
together in their quest for self-governance while under occupation, and ironically the 
same ego divides them when they are independent of a foreign threat.  This repeated 
phenomenon of cohesion and separation is visible after every occupation and withdrawal 
of intervening powers.  
 
Table 2.   Case Selections for Stability and Instability 
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J. WEAK GOVERNANCE:  THE PRESIDENT KARZAI DILEMMA 
Internal conflicts are endemic infections in the body politic that demand 
attention and intervention--undulating fevers, old wounds, and running 
sores that do not heal, that result in neither victory nor defeat, have no 
common cause, and yet are merely the aberrational outgrowths of normal 
political processes gone bad.24 
Nine years after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, inconsistent strategies, coupled 
with the inability of international forces and the Afghan government to provide security 
and stability, has severely undermined the national government’s legitimacy. This 
political vacuum along with repeated interventions has pushed Afghanistan into chaos, 
where it has become a playground for regional rivalries. In addition, the Taliban 
insurgency has been able to exploit the political gap, managed to transform itself into the 
defender of Afghan society, and are viewed as freedom fighters in the eyes of local 
people, meeting their needs where the national government is incapable.  
Since 2002, the various methods attempted to achieve political, military and 
economic success in Afghanistan have remained subservient to one leader—President 
Karzai. For the last nine years, Karzai has wielded immense authority in Afghanistan, 
first as the appointed interim leader in 2002 and then as the elected leader through two 
national elections, albeit with noted irregularities in both.  He has also cleverly attempted 
to walk the line between appealing to international partners who provide aid and 
sustenance to his fledgling government, and conversely, standing firm so as to not appear 
to Afghans as too beholden to international actors.  Part of the power structure that allows 
Karzai to manipulate popular perceptions of his national leadership is that he controls all 
major appointments in the Afghan government, as well as in the provinces.  As president, 
he also manages the flow of funds and aid money.  He further has the authority and 
ability to manufacture and influence internal and regional alliances. Barfield asserts:  
“had Karzai been able to establish and extend his government control throughout the 
country, he would have met the basic test of legitimacy.”25 However, this tightrope walk 
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25 Barfield, Afghanistan, 341. 
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has also made it difficult for Karzai to weed out corruption and power down national 
authority to the provincial and district levels.  For this reason, the Karzai administration 
increasingly is viewed as illegitimate, which only fuels Taliban claims to authority and 
legitimacy.  
The extent of the Karzai dilemma can be seen in terms of the classical game 
theory model of the prisoner’s dilemma.  In this case, the Karzai government competes 
against the Taliban for rights as the legitimate ruling authority in Afghanistan.  Karzai 
must weigh the strategies of allying with the U.S. for aid and assistance or distancing 
himself from such aid to appear more nationalistic.  The Taliban, on the other hand, 
garners increased legitimacy when seen as confronting the foreign presence or less 
legitimacy when it is complicit to Afghan government activities or ostensibly the 
“foreigners.” 
 
Figure 7.   Karzai Dilemma Game Values 
Based on game theory calculations (Appendix A: Karzai Dilemma), President 
Karzai would appear to be the primary beneficiary of the current war.  For Karzai, the 
status quo seems to be the best option to maintain authority and control, though his 
legitimacy is weakened.  On one side, Karzai is also cognizant of the fact that no previous 
Afghan ruler has survived without appearing legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan 
population, and so he has been often critical of the NATO occupation and accusatory of 
counter-terrorism strikes in the populated areas.  However, on the other hand, he knows 
that the presence of the ISAF guarantees his longevity.  A cynical view might conclude 
that under these conditions Karzai and other warlords have no interest in creating an 
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Afghan state that would provide economic development or improve the welfare of the 
average Afghan beyond the current status quo, because this strategy has immense 
personal benefits for the higher ups.  More practically, he views the support of former 
power brokers as indispensible, because of their influence in provinces distant from the 
capital.  However, their allegiance has a cost, which requires him to turn a blind eye to 
rampant corruption in the government.  He also knows his weak security forces and 
infrastructure could not survive without the support of International forces to buttress 
them, and so Karzai continues to employ a series of strategies that cause many to think 
him duplicitous, self-aggrandizing or, at best, simply pragmatic.  These are all 
characteristics not unlike those of numerous Afghan leaders before him. 
K. AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES—RIFE WITH DIFFICULTIES 
There are three main issues that are confounding efforts toward the growth and 
development of a capable and credible security force in Afghanistan.  The first involves 
the general size of the force including both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan 
National Police.  To date, coalition forces have invested heavily in Afghan security forces 
to ensure a level of peace before their inevitable drawdown.26 However, based on current 
projections, for an Afghan Army of the targeted size to be built, it will require enormous 
levels of foreign funding to maintain it since it will be many decades before the Afghan 
economy can support such expenditures.27 Afghanistan will therefore be under foreign 
influence for some time whether directly or indirectly.  Even if American influence is 
regarded as benign, the following question remains: how many years until America will 
lose interest and completely detach itself from Afghanistan?  
Second, if the enlargement of the army takes place while the Pashtun areas remain 
disturbed by the Taliban, much of the recruitment will continue to be done in the Tajik 
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and Uzbek areas, as has largely been the case to this point.  This has the potential of 
creating a backlash in the Pashtun areas since it is unrepresentative of the corresponding 
population demographics, of which the Pashtun are a 42% majority compared to 27% for 
the Tajiks.  It is also probable that a Tajik-dominated army will be regarded as occupiers 
in predominately Pashtun areas similar to how NATO forces are comparatively viewed.  
The subsequent unrest could also have an impact on Pakistani tribal areas and in the 
Pashtun belt of Baluchistan as well, further destabilizing the area.  
 
Table 3.   Afghanistan Population and Demographic Information 28  
The third point of concern is that once an army of this size and structure is 
realized it will not be easily demobilized as security increases and its need declines. It 
will have to justify its existence and for that it might pursue a nationalist cause such as 
“Pashtunistan.”  That situation reinforces the Pakistani concern of the dreaded “two 
front” situation with India in the east and an aggressive neighbor to the west, and further 
supports the reason for Pakistan continually pursuing options that provide “strategic 
depth” in Afghanistan. 
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While there are many other issues such as illiteracy and high rates of desertion, 
the three points previously detailed are important because they highlight internal 
difficulties that could have potential strategic reverberations beyond Afghanistan and into 
neighboring nations in the region.  These are points that need to be addressed with 
Afghanistan, its neighbors, and NATO leaders as well to appease regional concerns and 
clarify foreign intentions and commitments of support. 
L. VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS AND AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE  
Committed to the survival of allies but lacking the leverage to discipline 
recalcitrant regime leaders, America creates a strategic vulnerability that 
even weak client states can exploit.29 
Village Stability Operations (VSO) includes the concept of governance and 
security forces at the village level, and is an ambitious effort by the ISAF to achieve a 
level of security in Afghanistan where, thus far, national Afghan security forces have 
shown only nominal progress.  The concept of bottom-up security may be a sincere step 
towards stability, but it has the added peril of potentially creating a parallel force to 
challenge the government in the future or so goes the internal master narrative to discount 
the effort.  “One of [President Karzai’s] top advisors cautioned against moving too 
rapidly in expanding the Afghan Local Police (ALP) because of the risk of empowering 
local warlords who could destabilize the country. He cited the damage militias caused to 
the country in the early 1990s.”30 However, this does come closer to the historical power 
structure that has defined Afghanistan for centuries; namely a loose administrative power 
at the center, which is bolstered by the tribal structure in the periphery.  So long as the 
tribes have been able to administer local affairs then the national government has had 
their support to administer affairs from beyond the national borders.  The stronger central 
government that is attempting to provide rule of law throughout Afghanistan is largely 
creating something from nothing.  A strong central government has not existed 
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previously and until it does exist in a viable form, something must fill the gap.  With this 
in mind, careful stopgaps have been employed in the institution of VSO and the ALP, 
which are intended to empower local villages but keep them tethered to the central 
government for support and authority.31 VSO are expanding based on initial successes, 
but efforts must remain vigilant to ensure that what was intended to be a stopgap does not 
in fact become the new normal, and if that is the intent then make sure it is a deliberate 
move rather than one that is stumbled into.  
M. DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN AID—NO END IN SIGHT 
Economically, militarily and politically, Afghanistan has increasingly developed a 
dependence on regional countries and great powers.  Due to geographical conditions, for 
centuries Afghanistan has attempted to manipulate conditions brought on by great power 
rivalries in order to advance its own interests.32 The government itself has become so 
dependent on foreign aid and loans that by 1973, two-thirds of its annual revenue was 
derived from foreign grants and loans.  While the people of Afghanistan have always 
bristled at foreign occupation, various rulers have at times found their stay beneficial.  
Beyond the Karzai dilemma already discussed, the Great Game even today has benefited 
a much broader segment of Afghan elite with the large amount of money that has been 
spent through various aid organizations.  Afghan rulers at numerous levels have 
leveraged diplomacy and made fortunes without improving security and the living 
standards of the population.  This pattern is widely continuing today to a degree that 
frustrates the efforts of coalition security forces to achieve broader peace and stability in 
Afghanistan.  As more and more members of the population see international aid efforts 
making only modest gains in the lives of the people and incredible gains in the personal 
lives of various leaders,33 this perception feeds insurgent propaganda and support.  
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Rather than remaining independent, the broad efforts of international aid organizations 
become increasingly associated with the national government and synonymous with 
corruption.  As long as this perception is unchanged, then obstacles to aid efforts will be 
nearly insurmountable. 
N. CONCLUSION 
Conflicting interests between the government and the Taliban has made political 
reconciliation a difficult option to bring stability to Afghanistan. Moreover, it is not clear 
that either side is sincerely interested in a reconciliation process for peace.  Many Afghan 
elites believe that reconciliation is not in their interest.  “They derive huge personal gain, 
through profits or graft, from what some regard as a ‘controlled’ conflict that attracts 
massive external resources.”34 On the other hand, the insurgents are seemingly expanding 
their influence and control, have a strong external support, and believe that they can 
outlast the coalition forces. 
In the last hundred years, Afghanistan has been one of the most repeatedly 
invaded countries in the world.  Occupation has been an increasingly destabilizing factor 
in Afghan history with each new foreign power.  In Afghanistan, it is now time for 
credible commitments by all players and powers to bring sustained peace, and for that it 
is important to have more traders on the ground than invaders.  It will take more than just 
internal improvements to infrastructure and governance though to achieve stability.  
Perhaps more important is what conditions exist at the regional level after the dust settles.  
If this condition does not receive equal, and in some instances more attention to 
reconciliation efforts, then internal peace will surely be short lived, and external interests 
will again muddy the waters and reignite the Afghan cycle of conflict. 
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III. NEIGHBORS:  THE REGIONAL DYNAMICS 
If [neighbors] don't stop, the consequences will be that this region will 
suffer with us, equally, as we suffer. In the past we suffered alone. This 
time everybody will suffer with us… Any effort to divide Afghanistan 
ethnically or weaken it will create exactly the same things in the 
neighboring countries. All the countries in this neighborhood have the 
same ethnic groups that we have, so they should know that it is a different 
ball game this time.35            President Hamid Karzai 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan in 1989, there have been two 
important reasons that the regional states in close proximity to Afghanistan have 
repeatedly become involved with Afghan affairs. Primarily, Afghanistan’s neighbors 
have viewed Afghanistan as a buffer state and have therefore exploited conditions that 
protect their self-interests, but most importantly, that would keep turmoil across the 
border and prevent any spillover effect.  The purpose of the buffer state was to prevent 
worse conditions from entering their own territory.  The second reason for neighboring 
countries to become involved is a genuine uncertainty about the international 
community’s commitment to Afghanistan.  This uncertainty has caused a void that invites 
neighborly interference.  As a result, neighboring countries have pursued policies 
designed to first and foremost protect their own short-term interests, always at the 
expense of building regional cooperation and broader stability within Afghanistan. The 
regional balance of power has always been a complex balancing act in South Asia.  As 
President Karzai eluded to in his 2006 remarks in Pakistan, preventing the Afghan 
conflict from spreading deeper into Pakistan, Iran, or other nearby states this time around 
will require a change to previous patterns of interference.   
There are deeper forces at work that are causing strife all across Afghanistan and 
the FATA.  Each neighbor in the region has concerns and interests that are strategic in 
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nature from their perspective but the threats are misaligned.  “India is trying to link its 
problems with Pakistan to the global menace of Al-Qaeda, Pakistan is attaching its efforts 
towards the war on terror, to the resolution of the Kashmir issue, while Iran and the 
Saudis fight over Shiite and Sunni influence in this region and the greater Middle East.”36 
Beyond the AQ talking points that stoke the fires of extremists is the ability to 
directly confront the genuine fears, interests, and insecurities of each party.  “It must be 
understood that a lack of economic opportunities in these areas escalates the recruitment 
for such extreme movements and ideologies and creates openings for others to settle old 
scores.”37 
There are so many things at work in Afghanistan that to call the issue of stability a 
“complex problem” is almost an understatement.  For this reason, it is necessary to begin 
with only the most central of issues.  Along with these core issues are Afghanistan’s 
neighbors, and incremental progress is dependent on the degree that progress can be 
made resolving their concerns over a regional balance of power, national security threats, 
and improved economic conditions. The aim of minimal regional cooperation might seem 
like too limiting a goal, but even this would be an improvement over the zero sum results 
each has pursued over the past decade and thus a positive step forward upon which to 
build for future progress. 
For simplification and analysis, core neighbors—Pakistan, Iran and India—have 
been separated from other neighbors due to their interest, level of interference and 
influence in Afghanistan. 
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Figure 8.   Regional Core Players and Basic Core Issues 
 
Table 4.   Summary of Regional Country’s Interests 
B. NO REGIONAL ALLIANCE WITHOUT REGIONAL TRUST 
Moving beyond just internal strategies and into the external approach to Afghan 
stability, one is immediately confronted with a dynamic consortium of interested 
countries.  The core countries directly interested in Afghan stability show multiple 
strategies and desired end states each has for achieving peace in Afghanistan. Generally 
speaking, the informal alliance of nations is generally bound by a desire to combat 
terrorism, but each country does so from the perspective of their own self-interests, which 
often conflicts with allied partners.  Across the board, the rivalries and levels of distrust 
among Afghanistan’s neighbors have created new challenges and perpetuated proxy wars 
within the Afghanistan Theater.  These tensions are felt in Washington, where “there is a 
growing sense on Capitol Hill that the war needs to change, right now, but no one knows 

























Pakistan No Yes Yes No Partially Yes 
India Yes No No Yes  No Yes 
Iran Partially No Partially Yes No Yes 
China Partially Yes Yes  No  Partially Yes 
Russia Partially No Partially Partially Partially Yes 
Saudi No Yes Yes No Yes No 
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how to do it. The rhetoric has backed everyone into a corner.” 38 With such caustic 
relationships, special care and consideration must be given to the idea of initially trying 
to rebuild the levels of trust among interested partners.  
To begin the process, core issues should be identified which have the potential of 
changing the status quo.  Three core issues that have such potential are: 
• Foreign Intervention / External interference 
• Reconciliation with Taliban  
• Afghan Nation Building/ Security Forces 
From these core issues, work can begin to identify common grounds to initiate discussion 
and reconciliation. 
C. THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION  
As discussed in the previous chapters, repeated intervention in Afghanistan has 
had a singularly detrimental effect on Afghan security and social structure.  Moreover, 
repeated interventions have disrupted the traditional Afghan society from within and the 
present condition of continued conflict only makes reestablishing governance more 
challenging. Beyond the internal situation though, the presence of ISAF has also changed 
the balance of power in the region.  Many countries have a dichotomous relationship with 
ISAF.  We will discuss further how many actors have benefited from the international 
presence on one side, while simultaneously opposing the actions of the international 
community out of principle and cultural values.  
D. PAKISTAN:  AMONG THE MOST CONFLICTED 
As Afghanistan’s primary neighbor to the east, and a territory known to be 
exploited by insurgents seeking sanctuary, it is easy to see why Pakistan is in an 
increasingly conflicted situation.  According to the CATO Institute, Pakistan is the 
beneficiary of U.S. aid and military assistance second only to Afghanistan in the region, 
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but also, “the seemingly open-ended U.S. presence in Afghanistan risks creating worse 
problems for Pakistan.  Amassing troops in Afghanistan feeds the perception of a foreign 
occupation, spawning more terrorist recruits for Pakistani militias and thus placing undue 
stress on an already weakened nation.”39 
Pakistan’s calculated support to assist in the Global War on Terror in 2001 was in 
stark contrast to its previous strategies. From a regional and realist view this is actually 
quite surprising because, after the ISAF intervention and overthrow of the Taliban, 
Pakistan lost a pro-Islamabad government and forfeited “strategic depth” against India.  
Previously, this depth combined with Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities had achieved a 
regional balance of power that Pakistan now feels vulnerable without.40   
The growing conflict in Afghanistan has also fomented serious security issues 
along Afghanistan’s eastern borders and the FATA of Pakistan, in part, because Pakistan 
has offered support to the U.S. and ISAF from the beginning of operations in 2001.  Last 
year was in fact the bloodiest year for Pakistan since 2001.  On average, more than 100 
people were killed every month in suicide attacks in every major city of Pakistan.41 
Radicalization and increased arming of the Pakistani society are some of the most visible 
third order effects of the growing conflict.  The militia forces that were once a strategic 
asset in Kashmir, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have now become a liability as American 
and Pakistani forces target them through infamous drone attacks and direct operations.  
This targeting has adversely affected the credibility of the Pakistani military 
establishment and civilian leadership as the radical political parties in Pakistan exploit the 
actions as evidence of Pakistani abdication of sovereignty in support of American 
interests.42 
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Pakistan is now gripped with difficult decisions.  It understands continued support 
of militia forces that carry out indirect actions against strategic foes complicates relations 
with the U.S. and international forces operating in Afghanistan.  At the same time, 
unconditional (and even conditional) support of international actions within Pakistan and 
in neighboring countries raises the ire of domestic politics as well.  It is a catch-22 
situation for the leadership in Pakistan. 
E. INDIA:  A POSITION OF STRENGTH 
In many circles, India is seen as greatly benefiting from U.S. actions in a post-
9/11 war against terrorism.  Apart from strengthening American relations, India has also 
exploited the favorable conditions in Afghanistan and disrupted Pakistan’s strategic 
defense in depth.  After the Taliban took control of Kabul in the 1990’s, India’s influence 
in Afghanistan diminished.  India continued to maintain relations with the Northern 
Alliance and has shrewdly maintained favorable relations with President Karzai, who 
completed university studies there. India has expanded its diplomatic infrastructure with 
consulates in major cities, such as Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandhar and Jalalabad, 
a move that facilitates their development projects throughout the country but also 
heightens Pakistani fears of infiltration and clandestine activities on its western borders.43 
Beyond endearing itself to the current Kabul administration and currying favor 
with the United States by supporting development efforts in Afghanistan and other trade 
partnerships, India has achieved one other key objective—it has dramatically broadened 
the perennial India-Pakistan conflict from a largely eastern Pakistan conflict centered on 
Kashmir, to one that engages Pakistan on multiple fronts.44 Some scholars refer to this as 
“strategic envelopment,” and in Pakistan’s eyes is the source of insurgency in 
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Baluchistan and elsewhere in which militants threaten Pakistani peace.45  Regardless of 
alleged Indian support for insurgent forces in Pakistan, the fact that India’s main rival is 
so embroiled in conflict would likely seem as a win, win for New Delhi.   
In truth, an unstable and radicalized Pakistan is the worst possible combination 
for India and one in which the potential for blow back greatly surpasses any short term 
gains for manipulating current policy on Kashmir or otherwise.   India has legitimate 
claims to investment and economic activity in Afghanistan, but broadening diplomatic 
actions or even military assistance in the form of training missions needlessly stokes the 
fire of concern from an Islamabad perspective.46 India would gain more in the long term 
by dealing with a rational actor in Pakistan rather than fan the flames of unrest.  
The rivalry between India and Pakistan has made the whole scenario in 
Afghanistan much more different and more complicated than it was back in 2001.  New 
Delhi has increased its political-military role in Afghanistan by assigning 500 border 
guards to protect Indian reconstruction workers, inaugurated an air base in neighboring 
Tajikistan, and supported Iran’s Chabahar port as an alternative to Pakistan’s Chinese 
backed Gwadar port.47 In turn, Pakistan sees its own dreaded encirclement being realized 
by these moves and India’s increases activities in Afghanistan. Logically enough, then, 
“India-Pakistan relations are in many ways key to the peace in the region,” as Julian 
Lindley-French has suggested.48  
F. IRAN:  WIN-WIN SITUATION  
Like India, Iran also has much to gain from a post-9/11 environment in 
Afghanistan.  Iran was likely supportive of U.S. efforts to topple the Sunni Taliban, who 
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were becoming increasingly hostile toward their Shiite neighbors.  A point even more 
pronounced by their own support of the Northern Alliance in the preceding years before 
September 11, but one that seems at odds with it historic antagonism toward U.S. 
objectives.   
Surprisingly, Iran fell in line with U.S. objectives in the ousting of Saddam 
Hussein in 2003 as well, but despite this incongruous alignment, Iran was uneasy with 
U.S. encroachment on both its borders.  For this, as well other reasons, Iran has taken a 
measured role with indirect attacks that target U.S. forces; not sure whether Iran itself 
would be the next target of American militarism, they also supported U.S. efforts which 
coincidentally installed friendly governments in Kabul and Baghdad.   
Ultimately their pragmatic participation in both insurgent activities in Afghanistan 
as well as supporting the Karzai regime can be seen as reflective of their disdain for both 
the Taliban and the United States.  Foreign intervention suits Tehran’s regional and 
global strategies and to the degree they can exploit one to pursue the other then Iran is 
truly in a win-win situation. 
G. REINTEGRATION WITH TALIBAN 
One of the most important issues between the Karzai government and ISAF is 
how to negotiate and reintegrate moderate Taliban and make them part of the leadership 
in Afghanistan. This idea is not new, but has not shown significant signs of progress to 
date. 
After nearly a decade of conflict, the Taliban insurgency has increasingly spilled 
over across the region despite its quick overthrow in the wake of Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  Despite this constant conflict, reconciliation with the Taliban has always been 
on the table in varying forms.  The Taliban initially rebuffed attempts by Karzai to 
include them in the transition government in 2002, though it is questioned how feasible 
this might have been considering the heavily dominated Northern Alliance administration 
that initially took hold.  Over the course of the conflict though, reconciliation has 
occurred at all levels of government though admittedly on a scale too small to widely 
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influence the broader conflict.  Nonetheless, peace talks continue and the hope for 
political reconciliation increasingly seems like the only possible conclusion.   
Many doubt American sincerity in allowing Karzai to act on such efforts, and 
think negotiations with the Taliban contradict American goals for Afghanistan to be seen 
as viable.  Some argue that any Taliban return to power would erode the NATO image 
and would be interpreted as “negotiating with terrorists.” While these assumptions may 
be true to a certain degree, delaying the likely outcome of reconciliation may only delay 
the inevitable.  
President Obama has repeatedly emphasized the U.S. government’s goal in 
Afghanistan as that of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan by pursuing the following objectives:  
• Deny al Qaeda a safe haven  
• Reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the 
Afghan government; and  
• Strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and the Afghan 
government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s 
future. 49 
Reconciliation is not incongruous with any of these objectives because the 
Taliban would most likely be incorporated into the structure of the current government 
and not complete return to Taliban authoritarianism.  Such an expectation would be 
understandable and even acceptable given the broad support of the Taliban movement by 
Pashtuns who are the ethnic majority in the country.  Provided this balance remains, with 
the Taliban participating in the government as opposed to ruling, one could argue that 
this balance would be acceptable to Pakistan, India, and Iran.  It would require assurances 
of non-alignment by the government in Kabul with any particular party and thereby 
balance the competing interests of the core regional partners.  
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Future,” Frontlines, January 2011, 
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H. SECURITY CONCERNS 
1. Pakistan Feels Marginalized 
Economically, politically and militarily, Pakistan views itself as the most affected 
of the core states. According to Ollapaly, “While Pakistani Pashtuns feel sympathy for 
their Afghan brethren in the U.S. campaign, Afghan Pashtuns remain suspicious that 
Pakistan seeks to control events in Afghanistan.”50 Pakistan is right to feel threatened by 
these militant groups.  The situation is not unlike the threat Jordan faced from Palestinian 
guerrillas who fomented unrest against King Hussein in 1970–71.  The Palestinians, like 
the Taliban against Pakistan, received aid and support from a benefactor and eventually 
turned against Jordan for various reasons.51 Over the course of the last ten years, the 
Taliban too have expanded their attacks to not just target Afghanistan and ISAF, but to 
also target their one time benefactor in Islamabad.  For this reason, Pakistan senses an 
existential threat from the situation in Afghanistan.  Neither Iran nor India or any other 
Central Asian state can purport the same level of destabilization like that of Pakistan.  It 
is out of this fear that Pakistan favors reconciliation with the Pashtun population in 
Afghanistan. The Pashtun population numbers roughly 15 million in Afghanistan and 25 
million or so in Pakistan. Pashtuns are known to rally for a fight, but they can also be 
appeased to fight against a common enemy, as was the case during Soviet occupation, or 
if a proper deal is offered. 
According to Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan controls supply lines for both sides of the 
war. NATO depends on Pakistan for more than 80% of the supplies, while Taliban 
depends on their safe havens in Pakistan to refit and resupply.”52 The Pakistan military 
fears the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan—an issue that has been understated 
                                                 
50 Deepa M. Ollapally, The Politics of Extremism in South Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
74. 
51 King Hussein I Web site, “Official Jordanian History: The Conflict of 1970,” 
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods5.html (accessed on 04/09/2011). 
52  Bruce O. Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad 
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from Islamabad’s view.53 For this reason, Pakistan wants to use talks with the Taliban as 
a point of leverage, so that maximum concessions can be extracted from the U.S., India, 
and Afghanistan in exchange for Pakistan obtaining concessions from the Taliban.  Based 
on the extent of conflict with insurgents within Pakistan itself, the ability to coerce 
Afghanistan’s Taliban is, as of yet, undetermined. 
2. India:  Prevent Taliban at All Costs 
Having already invested heavily in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, India supports a 
strong coalition presence in the region, ostensibly as insurance for its own efforts.54 India 
is wary of America’s intentions because it recognizes the confluence of interest between 
the United States and Pakistan over the so-called “Af-Pak” border. India is also 
concerned about the possibility of negotiations with the Taliban, because India believes 
Pakistan supports and harbors the Taliban as a form of state sponsored terrorism inside 
Afghanistan and India.  Moreover, India is also concerned that the coalition’s expedient 
withdrawal from Afghanistan would create a vacuum that cannot be filled by Afghan 
security forces and which might usher in a complete Taliban resurgence.  India fears that 
if the Taliban regains power, then it can provide a resurgence of violence to the Kashmir 
intifada. In other words, India sees the Kashmiri freedom fighters and Taliban as 
intertwined and mutually supportive.  India’s security concerns, despite having being 
varied and somewhat strategic are nonetheless very real and the 2009 Mumbai attacks are 
proof enough to lend weight to their extrapolations. 
3. Iran:  Oppose Taliban but Support Insurgency 
Iran and India would both like to maintain a Northern Alliance-dominated 
government in Afghanistan, which they have already sponsored for decades. Iran’s 
interests require keeping the Sunni Taliban out of power.  The U.S. threat of military 
action against Iran is all the more credible considering the number of U.S. troops in 
                                                 
53 Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 94. 
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Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran, however, has attempted to fight this threat through careful 
support of insurgents, such as Shia groups in Iraq and supporting insurgency in 
Afghanistan. 
Peter Tomsen, former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, told the Council on 
Foreign Relations in 2006, “A weakened Afghan state lessens the likelihood it can 
become a U.S. ally against Iran”. By maintaining a certain level of instability, he said, "It 
keeps us tied down. After all, we have air bases in Afghanistan where we could mount 
attacks on Iran." Some analysts refer to this strategy as "managed chaos."  Iran’s support 
of the Taliban could also be a leverage point until such time when it is under pressure to 
end its uranium-enrichment program.55 
I. ANALYSIS 
The core issues of foreign intervention, Taliban reconciliation, and Afghan 
Security Force capacity are a base that provides both an opportunity to change the status 
quo, and of which there are degrees of concurrence in a sea of contrary positions.  For 
instance, both India and United States are not in favor of having a Taliban resurgent 
regime in Afghanistan.  While it may be an commitment trap for the United States to 
counter the Taliban to justify their presence, for India it has roots in the history of alleged 
Pakistan designs to increase the level of insurgency in Kashmir while the Taliban 
government in Kabul provides ‘strategic depth’56 to Pakistan.  
In such a condition, India would ensure through political and economic measures 
pressure on the United States to maintain a permanent presence in Afghanistan, while 
attempting to isolate Pakistan from the Afghanistan peace process. Pakistan, on the other 
hand, would require of the United States to maintain military and economic aid, while 
keeping the capacity to maintain stability in Afghanistan. According to Bruce Riedel, 
“America wants Pakistan to focus on the global threat, be it communism or jihadism. 
                                                 
55  Greg Bruno and Lionel Beehner, “Iran and the Future of Afghanistan,” (Council on Foreign 
Relations, Inc., March 30, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/iran/iran-future-afghanistan/p13578 (accessed on 
04/03/2011). 
56 A term coined by Pakistan military where a favorable government in Afghanistan could provide 
Pakistan freedom to use Afghan land and airspace in case of a war against India. 
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Pakistan wants to concentrate on the threat next door.”57 For Pakistan, terrorism and war 
in Afghanistan is now a war against existential and separatist threat. The situation is more 
serious for Pakistan than any other country in the region. As Christopher Layne observes, 
“states may have many goals other than survival, but survival is the prerequisite in 
attaining them.”58 
Any future conflict between India and Pakistan would have a debilitating effect 
on Afghanistan and the whole region.  An overt threat from India would force Pakistan to 
move all of its forces towards India which could seriously affect ISAF COIN efforts in 
the east and southeastern Afghanistan. For this reason India’s role and activities in 
Afghanistan may, in fact, result in regional destabilization, but could still be realigned.59 
Afghanistan has serious vulnerabilities in the west, but Iran’s own experiences 
and demographic changes greatly reduce the likelihood of an Iranian conquest in 
Afghanistan.60  
In contrast to Iraq, which is the cradle of Shiism—home to the faith’s most 
important shrines and seminaries in Najaf and Karbala—and also the 
country’s majority religion, the Shia in Afghanistan are a distinct minority, 
comprising less than 20 percent of the population.61 
Ultimately, the lack of trust is what weakens the relations throughout the region.  
Particularly in the case of Iran, the U.S. questions Iran’s nuclear motivations and their 
sincere desire to assist in the peace process.  Iran feels that Washington wants more than 
to simply influence Iranian actions, but rather to direct Iranian affairs through regime 
change.  Without an improvement in trust, headway is likely to be limited.62 
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For the present Afghanistan government, Iran is a friend and Saudi Arabia is an 
enemy, whereas for the United States Iran is an enemy and Pakistan presumably a friend.  
Strangely, American actions in Afghanistan largely favor Iran and are counter to 
Pakistan’s security concerns; similarly all actions in Iraq are again favorable for Iran and 
detrimental for the Saudi Government.63  Pro-Iranian government in Afghanistan, Iraq 
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Table 5.   Regional Interests and Concerns by Country 
Table 5 summarizes the regional dynamics and why the region is so sharply 
divided and disturbed. On one side stands Pakistan, with some support from China and 
Saudi, on the other hand, Iran, Russia, India, and the NATO, which are extremely  
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suspicious of Pakistan and the Taliban but lack a strategy to deal with them. They want 
the U.S. to stay longer in Afghanistan, but are also suspicious of an indefinite U.S. 
presence. 
A win-win-win situation is not often seen in international relations. U.S. - 
Pakistan-Iran cooperation in Afghanistan would be to the benefit of all regional countries, 
just as U.S.-Iran antagonism the last several years has been to the detriment of all 
neighbors. 
The United States’ approach to both of the primary neighbors of Afghanistan is 
colored by skepticism and distrust, much the same way that the populations of Iran and 
Pakistan regard United States’ military and political approach in the region.  Both Iran 
and Pakistan see United States helping their arch rivals in its Afghan strategy. According 
to latest PEW polls, more than 80% of the Pakistani public does not trust United States’ 
policies and military action in Afghanistan.  “Pakistan and a few other neighbors see the 
consolidation of the Afghan state, dependent on the United States as a long-term 
threat.”66 An Al Jazeera-Gallup poll conducted in Pakistan points to the fact that half of 
the Pakistani population feels that United States is the primary threat, while only 18% 
feel India and 11% thought the Taliban was a threat for Pakistan.67 This is the first time 
in the history of Pakistan that United States outpolls India as a threat, but may indicate 
that the time is right for these two historical adversaries to sit down and find a resolution 
to the broader conflict in Afghanistan. 
One of the key elements for success in COIN is to deny external support to the 
insurgents.68 There seems to be a free flow of guns and money from both Pakistan and 
Iran to help insurgency against the foreign forces. Recent interception of huge amounts of 
weapons entering in Western Afghanistan from Iranian border is a manifestation of Iran’s 
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active support for insurgency in Afghanistan.69 Clearly left to its own devices the same 
old strategies of self-interests will be perpetuated.  It is important for the United States to 
draw the core regional players beyond this point to strike some kind of basis to trust one 
another.  If for no other reason than to point out that mutual distrust has proved mutually 
destructive, then perhaps this will motivate all sides to see that increased trust is the last 
remaining way forward.  
                                                 
69 Associated Press, “NATO Forces Seize Rockets From Iran in Afghanistan,” Dawn News (Kabul, 
March 10, 2011), http://www.dawn.com/2011/03/10/nato-forces-seize-rockets-from-iran-in-
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IV. GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE REGIONAL CORE 
PLAYERS: REVISITING THE GREAT GAME 
Many have noted that the war in Afghanistan is a result of deeper regional 
conflicts, and in order to establish stability in the former, then the broader disagreements 
of the latter need attention.  The venerated statesman, Richard Holbrooke, has been 
recorded as noting, “A stable Afghanistan is not essential; a stable Pakistan is essential.”  
He recognized the key role of Pakistan’s stability, and as such it was highly dependent on 
the dispute with India regarding Kashmir.70 
A. BACKGROUND 
As mentioned in previous chapters, Afghanistan’s centrally located and 
landlocked position in the heart of Asia has shaped the course of its history.  As such it 
has played a role in both global and regional competitions.  Afghanistan’s regional 
neighbors have managed to penetrate and pursue their own national interests, which 
intrinsically share roots of political rivalries, economical competition and security 
concerns.  
While there is a general consensus among all the Asian countries over the 
importance of stability in Afghanistan to their national security and economic 
development, most notably the direct effect of pursuing their regional and national 
strategies—directly or indirectly—undermines Afghanistan’s stability. 
The question here remains: will stability in Afghanistan be sufficient to overcome 
these regional circumstances? If the answer is “no,” then what are the consequences of 
such regional competition on the stability of Afghanistan?  Will a regional approach help 
to enhance the regional political environment to support and sustain stability in 
Afghanistan? Is a regional approach achievable? What will be the shape of this regional  
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approach? Who are the main players? How can it be arranged? Will all the RCP be 
willing to join in a regional coalition? Will a final agreement be sustainable and long 
lasting?  
Previous research regarding balance of power theory and its relevance to neo-
realism regularly notes the importance of Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and John 
Mearsheimer.71  For the purpose of this thesis, we use the same definitions and 
assumptions made by previous research, namely that:  
balance of power refers to the tendency of competing states to alter their 
perceived power posture in order to ensure the survival of the state and to 
promote the power of the state relative to rivals that pose a threat to 
national survival. Where equilibrium is not achieved, war is the likely 
result because one side may feel threatened by the perceived lack of 
relative power.72   
The focus of this analysis will be on the neo-realists’ theories of offensive and 
defensive realism. We will attempt to explain the South Asian states quest for power to 
gain security and its impact on the Afghan stability.  
Determining which countries are the primary regional core players (RCP) was 
based on the political influence, economics, and security perception of each.  
Accordingly, the selected states were India, Iran, and Pakistan. A close analysis of the 
RCP’s international relations would reveal the following characteristics about their 
attitude and their strategies toward Afghanistan. 
India, as an emerging regional hegemony, is trying to balance China’s military 
and economic might, while employing offensive balancing against Pakistan.  Moreover, 
India seems to be a free rider in Afghanistan as far as confronting the Islamic militants 
and the Taliban.  Pakistan in contrast, being a comparatively weaker state, traditionally 
balanced conventional disparity against its archrival, India, through nuclear threats and 
proxies. Pakistan’s defensive balancing approach was altered after American intervention 
in neighboring Afghanistan and India’s increased influence in Pakistan’s backyard.  Iran, 
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on the other hand, is trying to employ defensive asymmetric balancing against the U.S. in 
Afghanistan by abetting the insurgency at times, while passing the buck to the U.S. to 
fight against the Taliban and Sunni extremist elements at other times.  Theirs is a role of 
convenience at all levels. 
B. PURPOSE 
The aspiration of this game theoretical approach, by using neo-realist theories, is 
to examine the ability of RCP to reach an agreement among themselves about stability in 
Afghanistan, according to their respective security concerns. Additionally, it will 
examine the RCP’s ability to form an alliance that can support and sustain such stability 
in Afghanistan by using their coherent consent over certain convergent matters. 
Moreover, it explain, how the U.S. presence in Afghanistan has affected the regional 
balance of power.  
The game theoretic approach here is primarily used to understand the regional 
political dynamics that influence Afghanistan.  However, it may also provide different 
courses of actions for the U.S. to exploit in order to ensure national security concerns in 
Afghanistan.  Moreover, it provides a road map to form a cooperative working alliance 
between the United States and regional players, which can support stability in 
Afghanistan. 
Although influence is neither measurable nor transferable, we assume that the 
influence sphere is assessable and can be divided, shared, or lost. Therefore, in the 
advance stages we’ll use interval scaling as a subjective way to first determine the 
amount of influence each of the players has, and secondly the perceptional weight of this 
influence for the player, and the division of such influence sphere between the players. 
Additionally, we also assume that the amount of influence each of the players can exert 
depends on different variables like physical proximity, ideology, economy, military 
power, and diplomacy. Therefore, we will use these assumptions in the course of 
constructing this game and assigning the influence values for each player.  
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C. GAME SETUP 
The game will be constructed in three phases. The first phase will illustrate a 
game that describes the political approaches of the two main RCP, “India and Pakistan,” 
which traditionally has been described as a zero-sum game;73 however, in the course of 
this research, the India-Pakistan game will be translated into a “partial sum”74 prisoner 
dilemma game.75 In the second phase, we will try to introduce the third player “Iran,” to 
examine its effect on the game. In the final analytical phase, we’ll introduce the dominant 
external player “the United States,” to highlight, how the U.S. intervention transformed 
the game and its impact on each player. 
D. PHASE 1: THE INDIA–PAKISTAN GAME  
The game is constructed to describe and examine the players’ strategy toward 
Afghanistan.  While each of the players has their own regional and national concerns and 
interests, both players have two options to achieve their national interests. They can 
either pursue a strategy that can ensure their influence on the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) or relinquish efforts of direct influence. The strategy 
may also be conducted unilaterally or through cooperation depending on their perceived 
interests. 
The main assumptions and rules of the game and the players’ behavior are driven 
from the neo-realist theories that were briefly described in the introduction. 
1. The Game Assumptions 
Assumptions for the game are as follows: 
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• The game is an ‘influence’ competition game, in which each player tries to 
gain more influence on the GIRoA. This influence is considered to have a 
maximal effect on the players’ national interests.   
• India pursues an offensive balancing, which is clearly evident and 
manifested in seeking a regional hegemony.  This would enhance its 
international status and protect its national interests; thus, an offensive 
realist approach is adopted and pursued through soft power means. 
• Pakistan, in contrast, pursues a defensive balancing of threat strategy 
driven from security concerns that have been historically rooted and 
exacerbated by the Indian hegemonic ambition. 
• Both players are initially seeking to maximize their national interests. 
• Each player prefers to play alone and to self-determine the conditions of 
security, national prestige and domestic politics; i.e., the maximum payoff 
or the best outcome arrives from unilateral influence in Afghanistan.  
• Both players agree that the stability in Afghanistan will affect their own 
countries directly or indirectly; therefore, the players’ second best 
outcome is obtained by cooperating, or at least denying the other player 
from unilaterally influencing the ultimate outcome. 
• The regional players are using various tools and means to pursue their 
respective strategies. India is using a soft-power means and its economic 
weight, while Pakistan is using ideological, social, and asymmetrical 
means to confront India in the region. 
• The historical rhetoric suggests that both players lack trust, which favors 
the unilateral strategy. 
2. The Game Rules 
The rules of the game are as follows: 
• Both players are rational players. 
• The game is conducted with imperfect information; i.e., neither player 
knows the other player’s action/strategy in advance. 
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• Both players seek to maximize their own national interests by increasing 
their respective payoffs. 
• The system is best described as being anarchic. 
3. Scoring 
In the “Influence in Afghanistan” game setup, the players’ two main options are 
either to have an influence or not have an influence. They accordingly pursue a strategy 
that can achieve these options; however, this influence can also be achieved if the two 
players cooperate and agree to divide the payoffs among themselves. Therefore, the 
scores would be assigned according to the player’s ability to achieve a unilateral 
influence, partial influence, or no-influence, respectively. 
• The best option is to have unilateral influence and is rewarded by “2” 
(influence). 
• The second best option is to cooperate with all or some players and divide 
the influence, which is rewarded by “1” (cooperation). 
• The worst payoff comes from losing influence, where the player gets a “0” 
(no-influence).  
Figure 9 depicts the interaction between the two players and the combination of 
their various strategies.  After showing the comparative interaction of the strategies, 
values are assigned to each strategy and are subjectively determined according to the 




Figure 9.   The Influence Game Strategies for both India and Pakistan 
4. India’s Options 
• 2:  Best Choice: to have influence within the GIRoA and prevent Pakistan 
from gaining any influence.  
• 1:  Next Best Choice: both players cooperate to gain influence; in this case 
they have to divide their payoffs between themselves, a difficult 
proposition due to a long history of enmity. 
• 0:  Worst Option: to lose influence in Afghanistan. 
5. Pakistan’s Options 
• 2:  Best Choice: to have influence on the GIRoA and prevent India from 
gaining such influence.       
• 1:  Next Best Choice: both players cooperate to gain influence; in this case 
they have to divide their payoffs between themselves, a difficult 
proposition due to a long history of enmity. 
• 0:  Worst Option: to lose influence in Afghanistan. 
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Once values are assigned to each player’s options, they can be input into the game 
to determine which strategy affords each player the best possible option.  The 
comparative relationship of the player’s strategies and their value will determine which 
strategy to choose to achieve a balance in the game.   
 
Figure 10.   The Payoffs for both Players 
 
 
Figure 11.   Pure Strategy- movement Diagram 
 
The “Influence in Afghanistan” game’s likely outcome, without communication, 
is the Nash equilibrium of (1, 1), while the dominant strategy for both players is 
influence. The red arrows show the dominant strategy for India and the blue arrows show 
the dominant strategy for Pakistan. This means that both India and Pakistan will exert 
their influence on Afghanistan.  Motivated by their ambition to increase their payoffs, 
both countries will try to pursue their influence strategy by different means to prevent the 
other player from improving, which will eventually lead to cooperation, or confrontation 
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that may lead to unilateral influence for one of the players while the other loses influence.  
This situation is historically demonstrated, especially in Afghanistan, where both 
countries have pursued their influence strategy for many years.  In the 1990s, India 
supported the northern alliance in Afghanistan, which encouraged Pakistan to support the 
Pashtun majority.  Eventually, Taliban control of Kabul significantly reduced the Indian 
influence in Afghanistan.    
By playing the game repeatedly, the ‘cooperation’ option should be the ultimate 
result and the game equilibrium. Unfortunately, the historical evidence shows that due to 
traditional rivalry and distrust between both players, the tendency is to move toward 
conflict. 
6. Strategic Moves 
The “Influence in Afghanistan” game, without communication, reveals that both 
players will pursue their influence strategy, which will eventually lead to either 
confrontation or cooperation.  To examine what would happen if lines of communication 
were opened, a strategic moves analysis is needed to determine if any of the players have 
a threat or a promise or a combination of both, which, if communicated, would alter their 
payoffs, or prevent the other player from exerting his influence on Afghanistan.   
a. India 
First Move: India 
i. If India pursues the influence strategy, Pakistan will choose 
influence also with payoffs (1, 1). 
ii. If India does not choose influence, then Pakistan will pursue 
influence with payoffs (2, 0). 
iii. India, in this case, can secure a better payoff by pursuing its 
influence strategy and achieve its second best option of the likely 
outcome (1, 1).  
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b. Threat: India 
i. India does not want Pakistan to pursue its likely influence strategy; 
therefore, India places its threat on Pakistan’s influence strategy. 
ii. Normally: If Pakistan plays influence, India plays influence with 
payoffs (1, 1). 
iii. Threat: If Pakistan plays influence, then India will not pursue its 
influence strategy, which will credit Pakistan a higher payoff of 2, 
while India will get 0 (no-influence), the final payoffs will be (2, 
0). 
iv. The threat hurts India, but it does not hurt Pakistan, which means it 
is not a threat. Therefore, India does not have a threat.    
c. Promise: India 
i. India wants Pakistan to play a strategy of no-influence.  Therefore, 
the Indian promise will be on Pakistan’s no-influence strategy. 
ii. Normally: If Pakistan plays no-influence, then India plays 
influence with payoffs of (0, 2). 
iii. Promise: If Pakistan plays no-influence then India will play no-
influence with payoffs (0, 0). 
iv. The promise hurts India, but does not benefit Pakistan. Therefore, 
India does not have a promise 
d. The Threat and Promise Combination 
This combination is not available for India. 
e. Pakistan 
First Move: Pakistan 
i. If Pakistan pursues the influence strategy, India will also choose 
influence with payoffs (1, 1). 
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ii. If Pakistan does not choose influence, then India will pursue 
influence with payoffs (0, 2). 
iii. Pakistan, in this case, can secure a better payoff by pursuing its 
influence strategy and get its second best option “the likely 
outcome” (1, 1). 
f. Threat: Pakistan 
i. Pakistan does not want India to pursue its likely influence strategy; 
therefore, Pakistan places its threat on India’s influence strategy. 
ii. Normally: If India plays influence, Pakistan plays influence with 
payoffs (1, 1). 
iii. Threat: If India plays influence, Pakistan will not pursue its 
influence strategy, which will credit India a payoff (0, 2). 
iv. The threat hurts Pakistan, but it does not hurt India, which means it 
is not a threat. Therefore, Pakistan does not have a threat.    
g. Promise: Pakistan 
i. Pakistan wants India’s no-Influence strategy; therefore, the 
promise will be on India’s no-influence strategy. 
ii. Normally: If India plays no-influence, then Pakistan plays 
influence with payoffs of (2, 0). 
iii. Promise: If India plays no-influence, then Pakistan will play no-
influence with payoffs (0, 0). 
iv. The promise hurts Pakistan, but does not benefit India; therefore, 
Pakistan does not have a promise. 
h. The Threat and Promise Combination 
This combination is not available for Pakistan either. 
Neither the threat nor the promise option is available for either player, 
which indicates that even with communication, both cannot secure better payoffs.  In this 
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situation, it is prudent to look into the players’ security levels and their prudential 
strategies.76 The security level is a way to determine the minimal payoff that a player can 
secure by playing his prudential strategy.  It gives a fare indication of the player’s game 
value.  By playing the prudential strategy, a player can assure that the least he gets is his 
security level, if his opponents choose to hold his payoffs down.77  
7. The Security Levels 
India’s Prudential Strategy Solution 
a. In India's game, India is maximizing “mini-max,” while Pakistan is 
minimizing “maxi-min,” the opponent's payoff.  We extract India’s game 
and Pakistan’s game to find the security levels from the prudential 
strategy. 
b. It is a game with India's payoffs. 
c. India has a pure prudential strategy to play influence whenever Pakistan 
plays influence. See Figures 13 and 14. 
d. The security level is Y=1; the value of the game is 1. 
Figures 12–14 show only India’s relative values in the game and thereby help 
determine India’s most secure option.  This option ensures the most value with the least 
chance of losing.  
                                                 
76 “In a non-zero-sum game, the player’s optimal strategy in his own game is called the player’s 
‘prudential strategy.’  The value of the game is called the player’s ‘security level.’” For more on this read 
Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, 69. 
77 Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, 69. 
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Figure 12.   The Indian Influence Game 
 
 
Figure 13.   Pakistan Minimizing Strategy. 
 
  
Figure 14.   India Maximizing Strategy. 
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Pakistan’s Prudential Strategy Solution 
a. In Pakistan's game, Pakistan is maximizing “Mini-max,” while India is 
minimizing “maxi-min,” the opponent's payoff. 
b. It has become a Zero-Sum Game with Pakistan’s payoffs. 
c. Pakistan has a pure prudential strategy to play influence whenever India 
plays influence. See Figures 16 and 17. 
d. The security level is X=1; the value of the game is 1.  
Figures 15–17 show only Pakistan’s relative values in the game and thereby help 
determine Pakistan’s most secure option.  This option ensures the most value with the 
least chance of losing. 
 





   
Figure 16.   Pakistan Maximizing Strategy 
 
Figure 17.   India Minimizing Strategy 
 
Figure 18.   The Security Levels for both India and Pakistan 
Negotiations set 
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As shown in Figure 18, the security level for both India’s “red line” and 
Pakistan’s “blue line” is (1, 1). This point is on the negotiation set, which appears as “the 
green line” connecting the points (0, 2) and (2, 0), the unilateral influence for both 
countries. On the negotiation set, which is the green line, the gains of one player are at 
the other’s expense.  None of the players can improve their own status or payoffs without 
hurting the other.  Accordingly, unless one of the players agrees to cooperate or is forced 
to reduce his influence, the other player cannot improve his own payoff.  However, as 
noted, the Nash equilibrium and the security levels have the same value. If we do not like 
the outcome, then we can revisit the payoff values using the interval scaling.  
8. Conclusion 
Both India and Pakistan will proceed with their influence strategies.  None of the 
players can alter payoffs by using a pure strategy, or the strategic moves.  The lack of 
viable threats or promises will reduce the players’ ability to improve their payoffs or 
knock the other player out of the game.  The players are likely to reach the game “Nash 
equalibrium” point, which is “cooperate,” if they realize that cooperation can provide 
them suitable payoffs, otherwise their aggressive competition to gain influence will 
ultimately erase their payoffs and their ability to influence accordingly.  This situation 
will lead both countries to a second-order option to either adopt other means to achieve 
their ends, or quit if the costs overshadow the benefits.  The game is conducted within the 
negotiation set, which is the set in which neither of the players can improve his payoffs 
without hurting the other.  The game becomes a zero-sum game within this set and 
exemplifies the conditions in the region after ten years.  If things were going to improve 
based on the strategies that have been employed by the different countries, then current 
strategies would have altered the current stale conditions that appear to exist.  
E. PHASE 2: ENTER IRAN 
In addition to India and Pakistan that were analyzed in the first phase, Iran is also 
considered to be an important RCP, and can even have an effect on the India-Pakistan 
game described above.  The introduction of Iran is important as a counterbalance, or also 
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as an Indian friend, which supports the Kautilya “Mandala theory.”78 This states that 
where your immediate neighbors are your enemy, then the neighbors of your close enemy 
are your friends.  With Iran, we can see the change in the nature of the game.  First, it can 
alter the stalemate, and secondly it can give incentive to all the players to cooperate or 
establish alliance. Another possibility that may arise from the cooperation between the 
players is increased splintering coalitions between different players; all these scenarios 
will be analyzed in the following non-zero-sum game. 
The actions of the three RCP, India, Iran and Pakistan, in Figure 19 show their 
respective orderly choices based on their political influence, economical interests, and 
security perception. The same assumptions and rules apply for Iran, where Iran pursues 







                                                 
78 “Kautilya is most famous for outlining the so-called Mandala theory of foreign policy, in which 
immediate neighbors are considered as enemies, but any state on the other side of a neighboring state is 
regarded as an ally, or, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”  Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthas’ astra on 
War and Diplomacy in Ancient India,” The Journal of Military History 67 (January 2003): 18. 
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Figure 19.   The RCP Available Strategies in the Influence Game 
1. Iran’s Options 
The game rules for Iran are similar to the previous India-Pakistan game.  
• 2:  Best Choice: to have influence on the Afghani government and prevent 
both India and Pakistan from gaining such influence. 
• 1:  Next Best Choice: All players cooperate to gain influence; in this case 
they have to divide their payoffs between themselves. 
• 0:  Worst Option: to lose influence in Afghanistan. 
Like the two previous two player game, the following figure shows the values for 
each player with reference to the choices and strategies. They can then be input into the 
game to determine which strategy affords each player the best possible option.  The 
comparative relationship of the player’s strategies and their value will determine which 
strategy to choose to achieve a balance in the game.  
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Figure 20.   The Three (RCP) Person Game Payoffs 
2. Pure Strategy Solution 
By examining the pure strategy, we can see that each of the players has a 
dominant strategy to exert influence on Afghanistan; this is clearly manifested on the 
movement diagram shown in Figure 13. The blue arrows show India’s pure strategy, the 
red arrows show Iran’s pure strategy, and the green arrows show Pakistan’s pure strategy.  
 
 
Figure 21.   Movement Diagram and the Pure Strategy for each of the Players  
3. Analysis 
The pure strategy of each player clearly suggests that they have a dominant 
strategy to exert their influence. The players’ desire to exert influence on Afghanistan 
opens up possibilities of confrontation and cooperation as well.  This in turn may lead to 
the formation of alliances. To determine the likely alliances, we need to examine all 
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coalition formation possibilities by considering all possible values for the alliances 
games. These values give a direct indication of the more likely coalition, such that the 
higher the value, the more likely the chance of a coalition.   
4. The Coalition Game 
In the expanded influence game, there are four different coalitions to investigate.  
The first is the ideal coalition of all three players combined; the second is a coalition of 
Iran and Pakistan playing against India; the third is a coalition of India and Pakistan 
against Iran; and the final is a coalition of Iran and India against Pakistan.  
5. The Ideal Coalition: India, Iran, and Pakistan 
In this coalition, the three players agree to cooperate and share the payoffs, which 
will reasonably address all their concerns and sustain their interests with minimal cost. 
The value of the game for the three players is (1, 1, 1). 
6. India Vs. a Coalition of Iran and Pakistan 
India’s Prudential Strategy Solution 
a. Regarding India’s payoffs, where the coalition is trying to hold the Indian 
payoffs down, India is trying to maximize its minimum payoffs. 
b. India's game:  India is maximizing “Mini-max,” while the alliance of 
Pakistan and Iran is minimizing “maxi-min” for their opponent's payoff. 
c. Since strategies AE, AF, and BE have the same payoffs and strategy BF 
has a different payoff, India will try to maximize its payoffs by pursuing 
strategy C hoping that it’ll get the best option if none of the players exert 
influence on Afghanistan. The coalition, on the other hand, will try to hold 
India’s payoffs down.  In this case, the BF strategy is dominated by the 
other three strategies, which means that the coalition will exclude the BF 
strategy to prevent India from getting its higher payoff. The only strategy 
that resembles the coalition is AE; therefore, India has a dominant strategy 
C to exert influence with a value of 1. 
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d. India has a pure prudential strategy to play in order to influence whenever 
the alliance plays either influence or no-influence. The probabilities are 1 
for influence and 0 for no-influence. 
e. The value of the game is also India’s security level: 1. 
Figure 22 depicts the subjective values associated with the coalition strategies.  
These values are a function of the points described above and show a mixed strategy 
solution for the coalition. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Movement Diagram for the Coalition of Iran and Pakistan against India 
7. Iran Vs. a Coalition of India and Pakistan 
Iran’s Prudential Strategy Solution 
a. The game is played with Iran’s payoffs. The coalition is holding its 
payoffs down. 
b. For Iran's game, Iran is maximizing “Mini-max,” while the alliance of 
Pakistan and India is minimizing “maxi-min” for their opponent's payoff. 
c. In a similar situation, Iran has a pure prudential strategy to play influence 
whenever the alliance plays either influence or no-influence. 
d. The value of the game is Iran’s security level of 1. 
This figure is also a prudential strategy depiction of a coalition, though in this 




Figure 23.   Movement Diagram for the Coalition of India and Pakistan against Iran 
8. Pakistan Vs. a Coalition of India and Iran 
Pakistan’s Prudential Strategy Solution 
a. The game starts with Pakistan’s payoffs. The coalition is attempting to 
hold Pakistan’s payoffs down. 
b. Pakistan's game: Pakistan is maximizing “Mini-max,” while the alliance 
of India and Iran is minimizing “maxi-min” of their opponent's payoff. 
c. Pakistan has a pure prudential strategy to play influence whenever the 
alliance plays either influence or no-influence. 
d. The value of the game is 1. 
This figure is the final of the three coalition strategy problems, and has the same 
values of the previous two; (1,1,1). 
 
 
Figure 24.   Movement Diagram for the Coalition of India and Iran against Pakistan 
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9. Conclusion 
The game value and security level is 1 for all players, which suggests that the 
minimum payoff any player can get by playing his prudential strategy of influence will be 
1.  None of the players can be driven out of the game, nor forced to unwillingly 
cooperate.  Theoretically, influence can be exerted on any country without physical 
involvement, but reality suggests that such influence should be supported with physical 
proximity, ideology, economic factors, superior political structure, military power, and 
lastly threat perception and/or security concerns.  Thus, the level of influence is directly 
proportional to all or some of these elements.  However, although the three countries 
share the same security ordinal value, this value does not mean they have the same level 
of influence or share the same perception of such influence. Finally, the security level can 
also be interpreted as the players’ status quo.  
10. How to Change the Status Quo 
In the previous calculations, ordinal scaling was used. This did not evaluate the 
weight each value has on the respective players.  For instance, the value of 1 is different 
in weight for each RCP.  To assess the weight, the interval scaling is arranged with 
respect to the assigned ordinal values, and thus we see that influence and cooperation 
have different values for each RCP.  
11. Interval Scaling 
The three ordinal values available for each RCP are to have unilateral influence 
with the reward of 2, to cooperate with another player and achieve 1, or to have no-
influence and get 0. 
As previously mentioned, the Indian quest for power to pursue its offensive 
balancing strategy against China and Pakistan has driven its regional strategies toward its 




power gives India a subjective value of 8 for its ability to positively influence 
Afghanistan, and only a 2 if it has no-influence at all. Basically the influence strategy is 
important for India but it is not essential for its survival. 
While the focus of the Iranian foreign policy is directed towards the gulf region 
and balancing Saudi Arabia, Iran has their national interest in Afghanistan as well. Here 
Iran would prefer a neighbor who is not expressly anti-Shia as were the Taliban, and an 
administration able to curtail the flow of opium and refugees into Iranian territory.  Under 
these circumstances, Iran would assign a 7 to its influence strategy, 5 to its cooperation 
strategy and 3 to its no-influence strategy, since its threat from Afghanistan is perceived 
as less severe.   
Pakistan, in contrast, views the no-influence option in Afghanistan to be a serious 
threat to its security and national survival.  This is in part a factor of the large Pashtun 
population Pakistan shares with Afghanistan, and the broadened base of support it values, 
as a counter to Indian hegemonic ambition.  Subsequently, Pakistan would assign a 
subjective value of 9 to its influence strategy and 1 to its no-influence strategy. Under this 
assumption, the cooperation (alliance) option is 8. The interval scaling values are shown 
in Table 6.  Figure 25 shows the payoffs according to the interval scaling. 
 
 
Table 6.   RCP Interval Scaling Values of the Influence in Afghanistan Game  
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Figure 25.   The Game’s Payoffs According to the Interval Scaling 
 
Figure 26.   Movement Diagram for the Influence Game after Interval Scaling 
Each of the players has a dominant strategy to exert influence on Afghanistan. 
This is clearly manifest on the movement diagram shown in Figure 26.  The blue arrows 
show India’s pure strategy, the red arrows show Iran’s pure strategy, and the green 
arrows show Pakistan’s pure strategy without communication.  
12. The Coalition Solution 
In the influence game, there are four different coalitions to investigate.  The first 
combines the three players and is called the Ideal Coalition.  The second is a coalition of 
Iran and Pakistan playing against India.  The third is a coalition of India and Pakistan 
against Iran. The final is a coalition of Iran and India against Pakistan.  
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13. The Ideal Coalition: India, Iran, and Pakistan 
In this coalition, the three players cooperate and share influence, and the value of 
the game is (8, 4, 5).  
14. India Vs. a Coalition of Iran and Pakistan 
 
Figure 27.   Movement Diagram for the Coalition Iran and Pakistan against India 
In Figure 27, values represented in strategies AE, AF, and BE are the same for 
India, while the value of the BF strategy is different, which means that the Indian payoffs 
will notably increase if both Iran and Pakistan do not pursue their influence strategy in 
Afghanistan.  However, since the coalition will try to hold India’s payoffs down, it may 
be concluded that the BF strategy is dominated by the other three strategies.  This means 
that the coalition will exclude the BF strategy to prevent India from getting its higher 
payoff.  Moreover, the only strategy that resembles the coalition is AE; therefore, India 
has a dominant strategy C to exert influence with a value of 4.  
The value of the game is 4. India’s prudential strategy is influence. The 
coalition’s prudential strategy is also AE, which is the only available strategy. Finally, 
since the game is assumed to be super-additive,79 then the value of the game for the 
coalition will be the sum of their cooperation strategy.  This is called “mutual influence,” 
with a total of 13.  The division of this value between the coalition members, using 
Linear Programming (LP), will be discussed later in this section.   
                                                 
79 Super-additive describes the combination two separate values, in which the resultant value is greater 
than the simple addition of the two original values.  For mathematical definitions and examples see, 
Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, 131.  
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15. Iran Vs. a Coalition of India and Pakistan 
 
Figure 28.   Movement Diagram for the Coalition of India and Pakistan against Iran 
By analyzing Iran’s movement diagram in Figure 28, we notice that Iran has a 
dominant strategy, E, to exert influence with a value of 5.  The coalition has only one 
dominant strategy to pursue its influence over Afghanistan, with a game value of 12.  
16. Pakistan Vs. a Coalition of India and Iran 
 
Figure 29.   Movement Diagram for the Coalition of India and Iran against Pakistan 
Pakistan’s movement diagram in Figure 29 shows that it has a dominant influence 
strategy, A, with a game value of 8.  The coalition in this case has only one strategy, CE, 
with an additive value of 9.  
17. The Coalition Payoffs Division 
To find the coalition’s payoffs division among the players, the Linear 
Programming (LP) method will be used.   
 76
18. Linear Programming (LP) 
Let us assume that the decision variables are X1, X2, and X3, and are defined as 
follows: 
X1= India, and the unilateral game value for X1 is V(X1) = 8  
X2= Iran, and the unilateral game value for X2 is V(X2) = 7  
X3= Pakistan, and the unilateral game value for X3 is V(X3) = 9. 
From the previous coalition games, Table 7 shows the possible coalition 
structures and their respective payoffs. 
 
Table 7.   Coalition Structures and Game Values 
Let us assume that we have the function Z, which describes the possible 
coalitions’ payoffs from the previous game, where Z (Xi) = V (Xi) for all i=1, 2, 3. The Zi 
function is subject to the following constraints: 
V(X1+X2+X3) =17 
V(X1+X2) = 9 
V(X2+X3) = 13 
V(X1+X3) = 12 
V(X1) < = 8 
V(X2) < = 7 
V(X3) < = 9, where all V(X1), V(X2), V(X3) > = 0 “non-negativity.”  
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To find the maximum payoffs the players can get, we need to find the maximum 
value of the function Zi (Max. Zi) for all Xi, where i= 1,2,3, and represents the coalitions’ 
payoffs. The coalition description according to the function Z is illustrated below. 
• Z1 represents - the ideal coalition, Z1(X1+X2+X3) =V(X1+X2+X3) 
• Z2 represents - India and Iran coalition against Pakistan, where Z2(X1+X2) 
= V(X1+X2). 
• Z3 represents - Iran and Pakistan coalition against India, where Z3(X2+X3) 
=V(X2+X3) 
• Z4 represents - India and Pakistan coalition against Iran, where Z4(X1+ X3) 
=V (X1 + X3). 
By maximizing the Z function, we find the payoffs division among the players. 
Table 8 describes the results after calculating the players’ payoffs, through linear 
programming.  Mathematical calculations can be found in Appendix B, but Table 9 helps 
depict the value of each respective coalition. 
 
Table 8.   Payoff Division Values 
 
Table 9.   Coalition Evaluation with Respective Values 
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19. Conclusion 
The following notes can be derived from the payoffs division: 
1. Comparatively, Pakistan has the fewest options and perceives itself to be 
at the greatest risk.  Therefore, it should not play a zero-sum game in 
Afghanistan and needs to open other options. 
2. Coalitions between the three RCP provide the only tool to achieve both 
secure influence and stability in Afghanistan. 
3.  The single player repeatedly achieves less than his security level, even if 
he plays his respective prudential strategy.  This suggests that the players’ 
best interest should be toward more willingness to cooperate, and thereby 
protect their influence. 
4. Players should be prepared to sacrifice some of their influence to form a 
coalition, because not sharing will result in less value than sharing.  
5. The previous points provide evidence that the influence sphere is limited 
and mutually dependent.   
6. Not all the players, even if they cooperate and join a coalition, can secure 
their security levels. Pakistan, for example, cannot reach its security level 
in any two-player game.  Additionally, if Pakistan allows the other players 
to form a coalition it would seriously degrade Pakistan’s own influence. 
7. While it is easier for the players to reach their security level payoffs if they 
all play separately, when coalitions start to form they should join one. 
8. Coalitions without side payments: 
a. India prefers to play with Pakistan, which is unrealistic provided 
the initial two-player game described here. 
b. Iran prefers to play with Pakistan. 
c. Pakistan cannot get above its security level by joining any 
coalition; but to reduce its losses, it prefers to play with Iran. 
d. The likely coalition to form, if Pakistan accepts, is Iran and 
Pakistan.  Since Iran does not have an incentive to join, India and 
Pakistan should accept to go below their security level. 
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e. Coalitions with side payment:  With side-payments the coalition 
formation depends on negotiations and it is also dependent upon 
the weight of incentive each player can provide or convince the 
others to play toward his side. 
f. The ideal coalition is the only coalition that satisfies the three 
players’ security levels. 
g. The second easiest coalition to form is Iran and Pakistan, since 
Pakistan should offer Iran only half a unit of its influence to 
encourage Iran to join. 
h. The third coalition is India and Iran, since India needs to give only 
one 1 unit of influence to Iran to encourage Iran to join in. 
i. The last coalition is India and Pakistan. In this coalition India 
needs to provide Pakistan with one and half units to induce 
Pakistan to join the coalition, which is almost what India is getting 
above its security level if it plays alone. From the two-player game 
first described, the conclusion was that both will proceed alone and 
will not agree to cooperate, so the coalition is unlikely to form.  
20. Assessment 
The previous model shows the regional dynamics and regional balance of power 
conditions from a pre-9/11 perspective. Pakistan was able to gain maximum influence in 
Afghanistan before 2001 due to a favorable Taliban government in Kabul.  Iran and India 
on the other hand separately cooperated with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, who lost 
influence after the rise of the Taliban 
The value of the game suggests that none of the players would agree to go below 
what each can get by playing his prudential strategy, which is not optimal.  The game, 
therefore, recommends that India would have less incentive to cooperate with any of the 
players.  However, from its security perspective, it would prefer an alliance with Pakistan 
if the game were played repeatedly.  Additionally, Iran, driven by its concerns, would be 
open to cooperate with any of the players, but prefers to form a coalition with Pakistan.  
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The game also proposes that Pakistan, under its security concerns, would be very 
motivated to form an alliance with any of the players, but also prefers a coalition with 
Iran.  However, according to the previous 2x2 game, Pakistan would be reluctant to 
cooperate with India under these security conditions, especially while India itself does 
not have the incentive to form such an alliance.  The likely coalition in the absence of a 
Taliban regime would thus be between Pakistan and Iran.  
F. PHASE 3: U.S. PRESENCE AND ITS AFFECT ON THE GAME 
After analyzing the “Influence in Afghanistan” game between the three RCP, the 
effect of the United States intervention and continuing presence will now be considered. 
This surely alters the players’ priorities in Afghanistan, and may also change the 
outcomes of the various games.  With this factor included, a review of interval scaling is 
also necessary.  
1. Interval Scaling 
As a result of U.S. presence in Afghanistan, as derived from Chapter III, India 
benefits greatly and is anxious to maintain influence in Afghanistan. Therefore, in the 
scale we see a rise in the weight of India’s influence strategy, and the new value is 9.  
With increased influence in Afghanistan, India sees less reason to compromise with 
Pakistan or Iran.  This will decrease the weight of its cooperation option to 3, and it’s no-
influence strategy to 2, though an existential threat is still unlikely. 
Iran has also increased its level of influence since the U.S. intervention, but also 
feels threatened due to the large U.S. troop presence on its borders.  For Iran to maintain 
influence in Afghanistan, it is now a struggle for sovereignty and survival, so we see 
considerable increase in weight from 7 to 10.  With U.S. presence and the threat it 
represents, Iran has more interest in cooperating with India or Pakistan, and values this 
strategy as an 8.  Iran’s no-influence strategy is also an unacceptable position considering 
the presence of American forces.  Accordingly, the no-influence strategy will have a 
value of 1. 
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Pakistan, above all others, perceives the no-influence option in Afghanistan to be 
an existential threat to its security and survival.  The presence of an anti-Pakistani regime 
in Kabul and rising Indian influence in Afghanistan increases the weight of influence for 
Pakistan to a value of 10.  The no-influence strategy remains 0, and the cooperation 
(alliance) option is better than nothing so they are willing to lower this value to 5. 
The perceived weight of the strategies mentioned above is shown in Table 10 in 
interval scaling format.  Figures 30 and 31 show the game values and movement diagram 
similar to what was calculated before for the same game.  Here though, interval scaling is 
utilized and these values are calculated utilizing the same coalition conditions, except 
now the U.S. presence is factored into the game’s strategies.   
 
Table 10.   Interval Scaling in Light of U.S. Presence in the Region 
 







Figure 31.   Movement Diagram for Interval Scaling with U.S. Presence 
2. The Coalition Payoffs Division 
As in phase II, assume that the decision variables are X1, X2, and X3, which are 
defined as follow: 
X1= India, and the unilateral game value for X1 is V(X1) = 9 
X2= Iran, and the unilateral game value for X2 is V(X2) = 10 
X3= Pakistan, and the unilateral game value for X3 is V(X3) = 10. 
From the previous coalition games, Table 11 shows the possible coalition 
structures and their respective payoffs. 
 
Table 11.   Possible Coalition Structures and Their Respective Payoffs 
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Let us assume that we have the function Z, which describes the possible 
coalitions’ payoffs from the previous game, where Z (Xi) = V (Xi). The function Z is 
subject to the following constraints shown below: 
V(X1+X2+X3) =16 
V(X1+X2) = 11 
V(X2+X3) = 13 
V(X1+X3) = 8 
V(X1) < = 9 
V(X2) < = 10 
V(X3) < = 10, where all V(X1), V(X2), V(X3) > = 0 “non-negativity.”  
To find the maximum payoffs the players can receive under the previous 
constraints, we need to find the maximum value of the function Zi (Max. Zi) for all Xi, 
where i=1, 2, 3, which represents the coalitions’ payoffs. The coalition description 
according to the function Z is illustrated below: 
• Z1 represents - the ideal coalition Z1(X1+X2+X3) =V(X1+X2+X3) 
• Z2 represents - India and Iran coalition against Pakistan, where Z2(X1+X2) 
= V(X1+X2) 
• Z3 represents - Iran and Pakistan coalition against India, where Z3(X2+X3) 
=V(X2+X3) 
• Z4 represents - India and Pakistan coalition against Iran, where Z4(X1+ X3) 
=V (X1 + X3). 
Table 12 describes the results after calculating the players’ payoffs, through linear 
programming.  Mathematical calculations can be found in Appendix C, but Table 13 
helps show the value of each respective coalition. 
 




Table 13.   Coalition Evaluation of the Three RCP 
3. Conclusion 
The following notes can be derived from the payoffs division: 
1. Confrontations severely reduce the payoffs.  
2. Coalitions provide the only tool to secure influence in Afghanistan. 
3. The single player under this division gets under his security level, even if 
he plays his respective prudential strategy. This suggests that the players 
should show more willingness to cooperate in order to join a coalition that 
can protect their influence. 
4. Players should be prepared to sacrifice some of their influence to form a 
coalition, but this is better than no-influence.  
5. Not all the players, even if they cooperate and join a coalition, can secure 
their security levels. Iran, for example, cannot achieve its security level in 
any two-player game.  Additionally, if Iran insists on playing alone it 
severely undermines its payoffs. 
6. Looking at India’s payoffs, if Iran and Pakistan form a coalition, this 
coalition will severely reduce India’s influence. 
7. Pakistan is still in a better situation in this game, as it loses only 2.2 units 
of its influence in the worst-case scenario.  This may be related to the wide 
Pashtun support that Pakistan has on both sides of Durand line, or the 
inefficiencies of the GIRoA. 
8. It is easier for the players to achieve their security level payoffs if they all 
play separately; however, when coalitions form, they should join one. 
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9. Coalitions without side payments: 
a. India prefers to play with Iran. 
b. Iran cannot move beyond its security level by joining any 
coalition, but to reduce its losses it prefers to play with Pakistan. 
c. Pakistan prefers to play with Iran. 
d. The likely coalition to form, if Iran accepts, is Iran and Pakistan.  
Since Iran does not have an incentive to join India, Pakistan should 
agree to offer one and half of its influence units to Iran as an 
incentive to form a coalition. 
10. Coalition with side payment: 
a. The ideal coalition is the only coalition that satisfies the three 
players’ security levels. However, other coalitions can provide 
more payoffs to the players.  
b. The second probable coalition of Iran and Pakistan may not be 
possible if the U.S. and Saudi Arabia oppose.  This may in part be 
due to its religious and ideological orientation and its dependence 
on American aid.  
c. The third coalition is India and Iran. This coalition will leave India 
with its best outcome, but at the same time it will not satisfy Iran’s 
security level. However, Iran may accept this option to enhance its 
political situation in relation to the U.S. and its regional reach.  
India in this setup needs to give at least two units of influence to 
Iran to guarantee Iran’s acceptance, which will reduce the 
advantages India can get and reduce its influence accordingly. 
d. The last coalition is India and Pakistan.  In this coalition, India 
needs to provide Pakistan with a half unit to induce Pakistan to join 
the coalition. Note that the gap here between India and Pakistan 
has already been reduced to its minimum. The main concern for 
Pakistan is the view that U.S. policies have favored India and 
reduced their space to maneuver. Pakistan now is trapped between 
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the U.S. and India.  Especially after the killing of Osama bin 
Laden, Pakistan is under intense international pressure.  This also 
provides an opportunity for the U.S. to address the security 
concerns of Pakistan and make it an honest ally against Al Qaeda.  
Issues like Kashmir will continue to pose an obstacle, though, and 
should be addressed.  There are limited opportunities for all 
involved, but if navigated judiciously the potential exists of 




V. THE RELEVANT PLAYERS 
The special aspect of Afghanistan is that it has powerful neighbors or 
near-neighbors—Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Iran. Each is threatened 
in one way or another and, in many respects, more than we [the United 
States] are by the emergence of a base for international terrorism: 
Pakistan by Al Qaeda; India by general jihadism...China by 
fundamentalist Shiite jihadists in Xinjiang; Russia by unrest in the Muslim 
south; even Iran by the fundamentalist Sunni Taliban.80    Henry Kissinger 
A. THE RELEVANT FEW 
The core regional countries discussed in Chapter III, (Pakistan India, and Iran) 
were those determined to have the greatest levels of influence, interference and stakes in 
Afghanistan.  There are other nations that are both regional and global players and also 
have significant concerns regarding foreign military presence, economic activity and 
diplomatic relations in Afghanistan.  These countries operate primarily at the system 
level and include such nations as Central Asian Republics (CARs), China, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, and Turkey.  Many are closely monitoring and even contributing towards stability 
in Afghanistan in their own ways.  Russia and China are major global powers with 
important regional interests, while Saudi Arabia and Turkey are crucial and strategic 
Muslim partners in Afghanistan.  As immediate neighbors to the north, the CARs each 
feel the reverberations from instability in the south, but can positively affect economic 
conditions through trade relations and more open systems.  All these players form the 
second circle of influence for Afghanistan, after the core countries, and have a significant 
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Figure 32.   Afghanistan: Iceberg and the Layers of Influence 
B. SYSTEM LEVEL PLAYERS (SLP) 
One major change in the new Great Game in Afghanistan is the increase in the 
number of powerful players.  This is in part a result of the rise of post-colonial and post-
Soviet Union independent states.  Many of Afghanistan’s regional neighbors have sizable 
strength and influence, and there are many other issues interwoven into the relationships 
and which extend beyond Afghanistan.  For instance, the nuclear ambitions in the region 
among Pakistan, India, and Iran have historically been at odds with U.S. and international 
nonproliferation policies.  This point of contention inevitably bleeds over into other 
relations and in part is why Afghan cooperation is so convoluted. Where cooperation is 
required, coercive tools and deterrence can have a limited effect especially with strong 
neighbors.  On the other hand, analysis of the different system level players can reveal 
important concerns as well as conditions for cooperation that may prove beneficial in 




C. CHINA:  THE NEW GIANT 
China in recent years has changed its only eastward approach and directed efforts 
further west and northwest.  Beginning with the investment of $3 billion in the Afghan 
copper project, it is clear that China has investment and economic interest in the region 
and this is a point upon which to build.  
China has an extensive economic, military and nuclear relationship with Pakistan, 
and the friendship between the two countries has been long lasting and resilient.  China 
also shares Pakistan’s wariness about India’s growing influence in Afghanistan, though 
clearly the threat is less pressing for them.  “This relationship is likely to grow in the 
wake of the CIA rupture with the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI).”81  
While China may seem to be supportive of U.S. policies in the region, it benefits more by 
standing in the wings while the U.S. underwrites conflicts and reconstruction, and then 
China attempts to fill the void diplomatically as U.S. prestige in the region wanes.  
When it comes to Southwest Asia, China has acutely prioritized its commitments 
and areas of interest.  According to Niklas Swanstrom, “China has four aims in the 
region: Development of Xinjiang; political and regional stability; energy security; and an 
alternate transport corridor to Europe and South Asia.”82  Western China is so expansive 
that it is almost a landlocked country.  It is closer to the Indian Ocean than to the South 
China Sea, and thus looks increasingly towards its western borders to expand and develop 
this region, as well as to sustain the massive growth China is experiencing.   China’s 
active participation in building Pakistan’s Gawadar port is also testimony to the fact that 
China seeks strategic connectivity with the Arabian Sea.  Perhaps China’s most pressing 
interest is the ability to sustain its upward growth curve, but equally important is to stave 
off any conditions which might disrupt this growth such as violent extremism or 
terrorism. 
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D. RUSSIA:  THE SILENT BEAR 
Second to China in size and economic interest in Afghanistan is Russia, who 
some may argue is enjoying a free ride as other nations fight to achieve many of Russia’s 
own self-interests without bearing any of the costs.   Even more interesting is the fact that 
two of the countries that collaborated in forcing Soviet troops out of Afghanistan in 1989 
(Pakistan and the United States) are today fighting against the same adversary that was 
raised and nurtured by them to counter the Soviets, and is today even more dangerous and 
determined.  Russia also views America’s increasing influence in the region with a 
degree of skepticism and distrust as it always has when American presence increases near 
its borders, such as in the entire western European region.  While it supports American 
efforts in the counter-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan, it likely has not forgotten the 
memories of its own Afghan War (1979-89) and the roll of the U.S. in supporting anti-
Soviet Mujahedeen.  In the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, “This was an opportunity of 
giving the USSR its Vietnam War” 83—to demoralize and bleed the Red Army dry.  
Some may have said that following Vietnam, the Soviet excursion into Afghanistan 
evened the score between the two states, but there is no doubt that the memories and 
resentment remain and play a distant role in the interaction between the two. 
While Russia has kept its distance from directly becoming involved in 
Afghanistan this time around, the Russians are playing an active role in the SCO, which 
seeks to address the challenges of terrorism, separatism and extremism.  In this capacity, 
Russia has offered a forum for dialogue with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran for aligning 
their interests in Afghanistan.  Russians, like the Chinese, have been silently pursuing 
policies of regional alliance with the key countries in the region, and this too aligns with 
their perceived interests in capitalizing on ripe economic conditions and controlling the 
regional threats they perceive as growing in some instances.  
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E. SAUDI ARABIA AND THE MUSLIM WORLD:  FORCE MULTIPLIERS 
Unfortunately, Afghanistan today has become a focal point for a myriad of 
Jihadist organizations drawn to the prospect of fighting against the West, as espoused by 
their radical leadership.  According to Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project, "Anti Americanism has worsened among America's European allies 
and is very, very bad in the Muslim world.”84 
Under these conditions, Saudi Arabia’s influence as the caretaker of Islam’s 
holiest sites could prove very helpful to friendly Western nations.  Two major interests 
motivate Saudi Arabia’s deep involvement in Afghanistan today. First, Saudi Arabia acts 
as a partner with the United States in targeting its local radicals and extremists who are 
potential threats to the kingdom.  Osama Bin Laden himself was a Saudi before his 
citizenship was revoked for threatening the royal family.  Second, the Saudis want to 
counter the spread of Iranian Shia ideology by preaching their own ‘Wahabi’ ideology.85  
During the rise of the Taliban, the ‘Golden Chain’ was established as a means of 
informally connecting prominent Saudi and Gulf state individuals with the cause of 
likeminded Afghan fighters.86  This introduced massive amounts of funds to prolong the 
fight, as well as funding specific madrassas (religious schools) to spread Wahabi thought, 
and lasting social connections to maintain influence for years to come.  As a result, Saudi 
leadership still enjoys a degree of influence on Taliban madrasas they financed and 
supported, which has likewise maintained their good public standing in Afghanistan to a 
large degree.   
Shia and Sunni tensions are perpetuated by the public and private competition 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  The Sunni House of Saud surely views the United 
States’ actions in Iraq and Afghanistan as conflicting, given their strong relationship with 
the West and the manner in which both conflicts have indirectly benefited Shia Iran with 
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favorable regimes.87  Nonetheless, the U.S. needs to better engage the fast growing 
population of the Muslim world, which is likely to be 1.8 billion by 2025,88 and the Saudi 
trust and influence is invaluable in maintaining links to the Middle East and the broader 
Muslim population.  
F. PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN TROOPS SUPPORT IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
Figure 33 shows the polls carried out by the PEW organization and how the 
public in different countries see American occupation and policies in Afghanistan.89 
 
Figure 33.   United States’ Rating in the Muslim World and Other Regional Countries 
As shown in Figure 33, the countries with a high Muslim population show much 
less public support for the conflict in contrast with other regional nations.  This may be 
emblematic of several issues, not least of which are the economic and political benefits 
some of the regional and system level countries reap from the efforts.  
This graph is also emblematic of the public opposition found within countries that 
at a national level largely support U.S. counter-terrorism (CT) operations and the broader 
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Afghan operations.  Allies like Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan and many others have facilitated 
a great number of CT actions, and while there are obvious benefits for each country there 
are also significant costs in terms of domestic politics.  For many leaders, including 
Musharaf and Zardari in Pakistan, Mubarak in Egypt, Saleh in Yemen and even Karzai in 
Afghanistan, support of U.S. policies have been a liability.  
In contrast to this predicament, other regional organizations like the SCO and 
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) may be able to breach this divide as they are 
viewed more positively at present.  The SCO and OIC may even be more effective than 
NATO or the UN in addressing regional concerns and security issues inside Afghanistan 
and South Asia.  Clearly there is not a silver bullet, but the social influence that certain 
system level players such as Saudi Arabia wield must be maximized, and if current 
strategies are not producing desired effects then it is essential to look elsewhere, 
especially for bold new ideas. 
G. REGIONAL CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES 
Other than the core issues, there are many other serious challenges for 
Afghanistan and its immediate neighbors that need focus and better understanding.  
These issues have direct bearing on the core issues as well, and one country’s domestic 
interests are no longer an isolated concern confined to the geographical boundaries of a 
single state.  Issues in Afghanistan, like terrorism, narcotics and demographics have 
international repercussions.  Some social scientists call these issues “intermestic,” as they 
are both international and domestic at the same time.90  With so many neighboring states 
and so many differing perspectives, it is only logical that there be multiple intermestic 
issues, which conflate the problem.  A deeper understanding of some of the most 
prominent of these issues helps illustrate the magnitude of the dilemma and delineates 
priorities to address them. 
                                                 
90 Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, 248. 
 94
H. TERRORISM 
Like the regional core players (RCP), the threat of terrorism is universally 
concerning for all the SLP, and the broader insurgency in Afghanistan gives training, 
experience, and connections to a wide array of terrorist fighters who export these skills 
back to their home countries in the region.  While Pakistan, India, Iran, China, Russia, 
and the Central Asian Republics each have their own specific self-interests in 
Afghanistan, they can all agree on the danger of the spread of extremism in the region by 
way of Afghanistan’s instability.  By creating a regional alliance and ensuring security 
agreements aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan, Afghanistan’s neighbors can agree to 
restrict their foreign intervention in Afghanistan and thereby reduce the regional security 
competition.  The development of arguably the most significant counter-terrorism 
operation in U.S. history has garnered mixed reactions throughout the region.  While 
some have applauded the actions, most notably Pakistan is defensive.  It is as of yet 
unseen how the killing of Osama Bin Laden may affect the combined terrorist operations 
that had previously enjoyed significant collaboration throughout the region. Clearly the 
lack of such collaboration would undermine the future successfulness of counter-
terrorism operations.   
I. DRUG TRAFFICKING 
Afghanistan has not only been a safe haven for terrorists in the past, but also a 
hidden paradise for drug lords.  Previously, the Taliban had discouraged the cultivation of 
poppy (main precursor for heroin), but as the insurgency has grown it has done so 
through the funding that drug trafficking provides.  In addition to the effects of 
insurgency and foreign intervention, drug barons have injected themselves into Afghan 
society.  The illicit economy that has flourished as a result of the drugs now accounts for 
fifty percent of Afghanistan’s GDP, so the importance and effect of this activity cannot 
be overstated. 
The effects of Afghanistan’s massive opium production are felt throughout the 
world as well.  The total number of deaths attributable to Afghan narcotics far exceeds 
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the number of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks to include the 9/11 tragedy.91 
According to Armen Oganesyan, “The war will not end if and when bin Laden has been 
caught or the Taliban routed.  The war will go on as long as the drug barons find it 
profitable and keep financing terrorism through drug money.”92  
 
Figure 34.   Drug Trafficking Routes Through Afghanistan93 
While Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opium, Iran is the world’s 
largest consumer.94  Iran has the highest number of opium addicts in the world, with 
more than three percent of the population above the age of fifteen addicted to heroin.95  
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Russia too claims losses of as many as thirty thousand lives every year as a result of 
heroin.  In NATO countries, the number of people who die of heroin overdoses every 
year (more than ten thousand) is five times higher than the total number of NATO troops 
that have been killed in Afghanistan in the past eight years.96  Any solution to 
Afghanistan's opium problems needs regional/global cooperation because it is fueled by 
regional demand.  
 
Figure 35.   UN-evaluated High Risk Areas in Afghanistan in 2010.97 
The map in Figure 35 depicts the high-risk areas in terms of weakened security 
and criminal activity, and correlates them to the insurgency areas.  Not surprisingly, high-
risk areas almost exactly mirror areas of significant increased opium production since 
2001 as reported by the UNODC.  According to the UNODC, “Kandahar and 
neighboring Helmand remain by far the biggest centers of poppy cultivation, with nearly 
three-quarters of Afghan opium coming from the two southern provinces.”98  According 
to Afghan intelligence estimates, “30% of Taliban income [comes] from involvement in 
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drug trafficking.”99  Similar to other narcotics-funded insurgencies in the world, such as 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (better known by its Spanish acronym, 
FARC), the Taliban roots of support can be severely stunted if effectively targeted.  As 
this is a regional problem, it will take a multi-pronged attack to defeat the Taliban.  
Policies to engage the growers in Afghanistan are only one part of the solution; the 
focused efforts of all the regional countries should likewise engage from their end of the 
equation if there is to be hope for success.    
J. DEMOGRAPHY 
We recognize that our fate - that is, our security, our freedom, and our 
prosperity - are linked to the people of Pakistan.100          John Negroponte 
The region, consisting of Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan India and China, has more 
than sixty percent of the world’s population.  More specifically, the youth of Pakistan, 
India, and Afghanistan are one of the highest populations in the world, and as such they 
are vulnerable to radicalism, if they do not perceive substantial incentives for education 
and employment.   This volatile nature of a youthful population has manifested itself in 
striking form recently throughout the Middle East, and yet an energetic youth can also be 
viewed as a national asset, if systematic and planned investment in human capital is 
pursued.   
The recently espoused “National Strategic Narrative” offered by two senior field 
grade officers in the Pentagon states that the United States’ first two investment priorities 
should be the education of young Americans and the nation’s sustainable security.101 
This may seem like an unlikely ordering from Pentagon insiders, but if the value of 
education and jobs is viewed as strategically strengthening society, how much more 
strengthening would an emphasis on education and employment be for the five hundred 
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million youth in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and India?  Education without jobs is a 
dangerous proposition, since this may be more fuel to the fire of insurgency if an 
economic backbone is not simultaneously fostered to support a young, educated 
populace.  Anticipating the needs and desires of this fast-growing demographic could be 
one of the most propitious strategies emplaced by a regional coalition and an important 
point to consider when devising long-term and short-term strategies alike.  
K. REGIONAL/GLOBAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
1. NATO 
As the central component of the ISAF, NATO has committed itself to achieving 
the lofty goal of sustainable peace in Afghanistan.  As the conflict has progressed, most 
NATO countries have come to understand and support a regional approach to resolving 
the conflict.  Most of these countries also agree that Pakistan is a central link to 
effectively pursuing a regional approach to Afghan stability.102  
Though NATO countries display a unified coalition, there are varying levels of 
commitment and interest throughout the alliance.  This disjointed commitment and 
tendency for limited engagement at the individual country level has added an unnecessary 
level of friction and strife in the alliance.  In addition, the decidedly Western face of the 
coalition and the drawn-out nature of the conflict (almost ten years) have further 
complicated coalition operations and strategies.  All these points notwithstanding, there 
are impressive strengths that NATO bares.  Finding an effective balance is important to 
establishing realistic goals for the future and solutions for the current difficulties the 
alliance faces in Afghanistan.  
2. SCO:  An Underutilized Regional Organization 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was initially formed to counter 
the ever-growing influence of the Taliban and their support of radicalism in Central Asia 
                                                 
102 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 82. 
 99
and China’s Uyghur province.103  In this regard, one can see many potential points of 
cooperation between this organization and that of NATO in Afghanistan.  The SCO has 
grown considerably since its 1996 birth, and the organization is facing major challenges 
as well as opportunities in the coming years. 
The characteristics of the SCO are one of several concerns regarding the 
organization.  Is it a political–military organization, an alliance, or just a multi-regional 
organization?  Where should its focus be: simply Central Asia or beyond?  The second 
challenge relates to the coordination of policies among member states. The internal 
dynamics between China and Russia and their relationships with the Central Asian states 
makes the grouping, in and of itself, very interesting. Given the differences in history, 
culture, and interests between these several countries, it is clear that each has its unique 
priorities. Finally, the decision regarding the organization’s expansion of membership 
poses interesting dilemmas as Iran, India, and Pakistan are all in an observer status.  
Since growing instability in Afghanistan in the form of Taliban terrorist activities and 
drug trafficking seriously threatens Central Asian security, it would seem logical that the 
SCO would consider an increased role in Afghanistan specifically.  The manner in which 
the SCO should interact with other international governmental organizations to promote 
cooperation remains a challenge though.  Specifically, its relationships with the Eurasian 
Economic Community, Collective Security Treaty Organization, and NATO are of 
critical importance. 
Under the present global economic situation, the need to turn to regional 
cooperation and to make use of the capabilities of regional organizations for achieving 
development and economic growth is undeniable. In describing China’s leadership role in 
the SCO one scholar said, “China has to balance between managing its relationships with 
Central Asian states and Russia on the one hand, while at the same time resisting the 
temptation to turn the SCO into an anti- West and anti-U.S. NATO-like alliance on the 
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other.”104  The system level players in the region and the United States have serious 
concerns regarding energy security, WMD nonproliferation, and anti-terrorism.  These 
are concerns that can unite NATO, the EU and the SCO in handling these issues. To 
avoid a new Great Game of power rivalry in Afghanistan, Beijing, Moscow, and 
Washington would be better off keeping engaged with one another in forums like the 
SCO and the OIC. 
3. Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) 
The OIC is strongly influenced by Saudi Arabia and has been effective in 
communicating the interests of Muslim countries around the world.  The OIC may not 
enjoy the same influence as the Arab League and NATO, but it is still seen as a forum to 
address issues of the greater Islamic world. In 2010, President Obama appointed Rashad 
Hussain, deputy associate White House counsel, as the United States special envoy to the 
OIC.  The appointment demonstrated the importance of considering this organization and 
its role in addressing broader concerns of the Islamic world.  In March 2011, a group of 
more than 120 international representatives from fifty countries held a meeting at the 
head offices of the OIC in Jeddah to discuss a range of political issues related to dialogue 
between the Karzai government and the Taliban.105  In this capacity, the OIC may 
become an effective forum for addressing the ideological narrative of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and help to resolve some concerns of the insurgents. 
4. The Silk Route:  Economic Strategy 
Traditionally, Afghanistan and Pakistan were at the center of the overland routes 
that operated for centuries connecting the major trade capitals of the world from East 
China to Western Europe.  “The so-called Silk Road was the most famous overland route, 
[and created] a world market for luxury goods that could bear the cost of long-distance 
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transport.”106  Since that time, this economically important trade link has seen the rise 
and fall of many leaders and even civilizations and cultures. 
Recognizing the importance of this historical precedence, it is surprising that 
more has not been done to formulate broader economic policies to capitalize on this 
point.107  Though scholars and historians alike have mentioned it many times, there has 
still been limited effort to build the necessary infrastructure to shape a future corridor of 
trade in the region.  
Despite the many security and political concerns that exist among the different 
SLPs, this should not limit continental and regional trade corridors.  This is a point that 
Afghanistan understands as it has recently been trying to expand trade in every 
direction.108  Unfortunately, the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, as well as the 
war in Afghanistan, has been two of the greatest impediments in improving regional and 
transcontinental trade.109  The economic cost of the Kashmir stand off for both India and 
Pakistan has been tremendous.  The perceived gains in security have actually brought on 
greater insecurity and continue to impede growth and true security and stability.   If more 
attention can be given to the reality of the expanding trade opportunities in the region and 
the transformative nature that improved economic well-being can have, then silk route 
success should be more persuasive in bringing disparate nations to the bargaining table. 
L. CONCLUSION 
Many writers think that what started as an isolated war in Afghanistan in 2001 
later turned into a regional insurgency, 110 but the truth is regional conflict has been at the 
heart of conflicts in Afghanistan for many, many years.  Today, most of the regional 
players view their gains and losses in Afghanistan as a zero sum game, which has been 
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the main hindrance towards peace and stability in the country.  This perception of 
regional players is based on traditional rivalries and national interests that have been 
exacerbated by the United States’ incursion into the region.  
The regional relationships that extend beyond the core players include the world’s 
greatest powers, and each has its own view of what success should look like in the region.  
The U.S. would do well to consolidate the moderate forces in these surrounding countries 
and strengthen their legitimate democratic governments to build a broader coalition for 
long-term regional stability.  The costs to stabilize Afghanistan are simply not sustainable 
for the U.S. alone or even by the larger NATO contingent.  Strong, stable and 
independent Muslim governments, along with regional powers such as Russia and China, 
will be able to counter the extremist non-state actors and their false hope of creating a 
larger Muslim Ummah without geographical boundaries.  The system level players have 
a validly strong interest in the region and a role to play in threats that directly affect them 
such as narco-trafficking.  Efforts to build a base starting with the RCP is important, but 
as that base solidifies the regional hope for stability becomes even stronger as more 
system level players become invested in the process and the outcomes.  This is especially 




VI. POSSIBILITIES FOR RESOLVING THE REGIONAL 
RIVALRIES 
Over the Long run, humans would evolve beyond war for three reasons: 
the great destructiveness of war; the growth of economic interdependence, 
and the development of what he called republican governments and what 
we call today liberal democracies.111     
  Thoughts on Immanuel Kant, 18th Century Philosopher 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the mountain of differing interests that face the domestic, regional, and 
system actors involved in Afghanistan, there is one central issue that unites them.  
Terrorism comes in a variety of forms and motivations for each country but the effects of 
it are universally destabilizing, and each nation is equally interested in limiting this threat 
in its many forms.  Before all international actors can work harmoniously against the 
threat of terrorism though, it is essential they share the same perception of the threat.  For 
this purpose, William Zartman’s ripeness theory and its concept of “mutually hurting 
stalemate”112 is quite relevant for Afghanistan.  
This theory basically talks about the warring factions, when they are 
unable to achieve a decisive victory, then the prospects of a negotiated 
settlement increase. Perceptions are tied to fears and motives, and 
discrepancies usually develop between a rich country and the one that is 
struggling for survival.113   
From this understanding, one can examine and recognize how the various partners share 
a perception of threat and what perspectives have overlap among the neighbors as 
opposed to what simply divides them.  
Previously, in Chapter II, the cyclical start and stop of development and progress 
in Afghanistan over the past two hundred years was described.  No one presumes that a 
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rural tribal state like Afghanistan, lacking the economic wherewithal, can immediately 
transform into a modern state; however, it seems clear that various Afghan monarchs and 
regimes have themselves exacerbated the state’s problems.  The history of Afghan 
leaders invoking or allowing global and regional players to use Afghan territory for the 
pursuit of their interests is long.  Many times these actions were in conflict with the 
interests of the Afghan state, but they often did this for economic and security reasons.114  
According to Barnett Rubin, “The more domestic legitimacy and the less international 
opposition to the Afghan state, the fewer subsidies a ruler in Afghanistan needs to 
maintain power.”115  The internal situation has consistently been very complicated in 
each respective era of rule in Afghanistan.  
What has changed is that, where once Russia and Britain dominated 
Afghanistan’s regional environment, today the disputatious successors to 
the Raj—Pakistan and India—play major roles, as do Russia and other 
successor states to the USSR, an independent revolutionary Iran, the Arab 
kingdoms and emirates of the Persian Gulf, powers like the United States, 
China, NATO, the EU, the UN and international financial institutions.116  
For this reason, balance of power theory discussed in Chapter IV fits 
appropriately into Afghanistan, where global and regional powers are attempting an 
“asymmetric balancing” against the United States and also against each other at the 
expense of the Afghan population.117  Examples of this balance of power can be seen in 
Pakistan’s actions to disrupt India’s reconstruction activity in Afghanistan, or in Taliban 
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Pakistani authorities for support and assistance of NATO operations.  In each instance, 
the weaker actor attempts to counter the stronger player in order to decrease the disparity 
between military, economic, or political capabilities.118   
B. PRESENT CONDITIONS 
From the previous chapters ,one can describe the current conditions in Figure 36. 
 
Figure 36.   Current Status Quo Conditions and Effects Need to be Altered 
In desiring to break the status quo, one must derive the relationship between certain cause 
and effect conditions, recognizing that simple linear connections may not be directly 
extrapolated.  Nonetheless, analyses can infer certain valuable relationships.  As 
previously noted, while the coalition of nations working in Afghanistan has made sincere 
efforts to transform the country into a stable state, the progress has been extremely slow 
and gradual.  This is in no small part due to certain assumptions (listed below) that have 
underdeveloped or proven unrealistic over the years.   
1. That the Karzai government would be able to rise to the challenge of 
governing and legitimately meet the expectations of the people.   
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2. That Pakistan would be able to assist in preventing safe haven in the 
FATA.  
3. That Afghan security forces would be able to take control of security more 
rapidly.   
The RAND study entitled “How Insurgencies End” details numerous 
characteristics of both successful and unsuccessful insurgencies. Correlations to these 
three points and the COIN fight in Afghanistan can be easily extrapolated in order to 
better understand the challenges and potential solutions.  RAND notes that anocracies 
(pseudo-democracies) rarely fare well against insurgencies, and Karzai’s ineffective 
government fits many of the stereotypical characteristics of an administration that is 
neither a democracy nor fully authoritarian.  As such, Karzai’s administration can never 
achieve full support or subservience from the population and flounders as ineffective and 
vulnerable to an insurgent movement.  Finally, foreign external support can be both a 
boon and a bane depending on the conditions.  To the degree that support creates 
dependency it is problematic, and the failure of the Afghan security forces to develop 
more quickly might be attributed in part to this over dependence on external support.119 
The nature of a supportive safe haven in Pakistan also does not bode well for a 
COIN conflict, and the FATA has clearly offered that to recovering Taliban over the 
course of the past ten years.  Ultimately, Pakistan’s ability to target all terrorist hideouts 
in the FATA is probably overrated,120 the Afghan government is too weak to govern 
effectively, and Afghan security forces have developed a debilitating dependence on  
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external support.121  While each of these factors has an important internal dimension, 
there are also key regional aspects that could positively influence each point if properly 
addressed.  
Recognizing that there are certain positions that are immovable for both sides, the 
final strategy for the U.S. should not be based upon “cooptive power,” as defined by 
Joseph Nye, which is a form of coercion that hinges on the ability of the United States to 
influence external powers to “define their interests in ways consistent with its own.”122   
Instead it should be viewed as approaching the conflict in order to help Afghans who 
have been suffering for the last three decades.  As an honest broker among the regional 
core players (RCP), the United States could better broker an agreement if it was 
genuinely seen as pursuing this goal.   
Understanding the substantial causes of ineffective governance, security, and safe 
havens, as well as pursuing primarily Afghan issues, sets the stage for attempting to 
resolve the regional balance of power.  The core regional threats are security, political, 
and economic in nature, and an alliance of the RCP to address these initial areas could 
regionally balance concerns in such a way that internal Afghan development could grow 
and stabilize. 
C. CHANGING PERCEPTIONS 
There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited     
-Sun Tzu 
At present, only the United States has the wherewithal to create a regional balance 
of power and convince all the regional players through coercion or persuasion to work 
together for stabilizing Afghanistan.123  To achieve a regional understanding, the United 
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States must remain resolved that a stable and peaceful Afghanistan is important for the 
region and the whole world.  It would be short-sighted for the United States to stabilize 
Afghanistan internally and then leave without coming to some understanding with 
Afghanistan’s neighbors about future engagements.  Therefore, the United State needs to 
engage Afghanistan’s neighbors in order to achieve stability in Afghanistan.   
Table 14 shows a longitudinal analysis of three important interventions in 
Afghanistan’s history and how the rulers during these periods were able to gain 
legitimacy and ensure stability/instability in Afghanistan. Of interest in these cases is 
how the neighbors, external forces, the incumbent government, and the population view 
one another; perception truly is reality and defines the nature of the COIN conflict and its 
relative success or failure. 
 
Table 14.   Key Characteristics of Historical Afghan Interventions 
D. CHANGING THE STATUS QUO 
To make progress towards stability, the status quo in Afghanistan needs to 
change. The United States and ISAF walk a fine line between providing enough 
assistance to Afghan forces and its government in order to enable them, but not foster 
complete dependency.  For example, Japan currently pays the salaries for all Afghan 
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National Police (ANP).124  This was necessary to jumpstart the security apparatus, but 
completely unsustainable in the long term.  Unless a clear plan for transitioning away 
from this payment imbalance exists from the beginning of the initiative, it will create a 
dependency and Afghanistan will not be motivated to be self-sustaining.  Secondly, 
without falling deeper into a commitment trap, the U.S. should endeavor to become a 
broker for a regional alliance and facilitate economic, political and security cooperation 
between the RCP.  Figure 37 provides a depiction of this balanced approach.  
 
Figure 37.   Balanced Approach to a Stable Afghanistan 
Though the balance between the United States’ instruments of power (including 
diplomacy, information, military and economics) has significantly emphasized support of 
military actions since 9/11, the need for re-balance could not be more prescient. To this 
point, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “We now need to work on the diplomatic 
surge to bring stability in Afghanistan.”125  Policy advisors have further suggested, “a 
diplomatic solution may need to precede an internal reconciliation in Afghanistan. 
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Otherwise, any security gains on the ground could systematically and very rapidly be 
reversed by the self-serving actions of regional powers.”126 
According to Joseph Nye, “In the politics of interdependence, the distinction 
between what is domestic and what is foreign becomes blurred.”127  What happens in 
Afghanistan has repercussions in the United States and elsewhere, and vice versa.  
Instability in the Middle East has been a cause of concern for much of the last century, 
and the conditions of the last decade, involving conflicts and global terrorism, only 
accentuate the increasing interdependence in the world over.  According to Rajan, “In 
this era of growing world integration, the frustrated young men in a failed state affects the 
comfortable citizen in a developed country in a variety of ways, ranging from the benign, 
immigration, to the malign, terrorism.”128  
E. FINDING A REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER 
Changing perceptions and the status quo of insecurity and distrust are imperative 
to establishing a firm foundation upon which to build on.  Alongside this task, shoring up 
a regional balance of power can take hold and in time intermingle the RCP in a mutually 
supportive and beneficial relationship.  According to Patrick Morgan, “To achieve 
balance of power, regional states tend to put great emphasis on autonomy and manipulate 
their relationships primarily on the basis of relative power capability.”129 The regional 
powers are less autonomous than the great powers, so the initial drive to preserve and 
support a regional balance of power will depend on the great power.130  The United 
States should launch regional working groups to develop a common understanding of the 
future of Afghanistan in the region with all neighbors, including Iran, Russia, China, 
India and the Persian Gulf countries, as well as all the local forces. Both the UN and 
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regional organizations offer forums to pursue these objectives. Afghanistan can no longer 
be an isolated buffer state; rather it can serve as a connector of a wider region through 
trade, transit, energy transmission and labor migration as long as it is not a source of 
threat.  While establishing Afghanistan as a focal point for regional cooperation is 
amenable to many of the RCP, the idea of making it a base for U.S. power projection in 
the region may not be compatible with this structure.  The long-term U.S. presence in 
Europe following World War II was enabled by the substantial overlap in membership 
between the security alliance (NATO) and the framework for economic and political 
cooperation that came to exist later in the European Union.  Without a similar 
overlapping of security and economic frameworks in South Asia, a large U.S. presence 
ultimately will be destabilizing and debilitating and undermine the regional balance of 
power.  
F. POLITICAL STABILITY 
1. Building a Regional Alliance 
American presence over the past ten years has had clearly effected the previous 
balance of power in the region.  According to Christopher Layne, “A state that attained 
hegemony would gain security for itself, but would threaten the security of others; a 
‘hegemonic’ rise is the most acute manifestation of a security dilemma.”131  Regional 
alliances like the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)132 and the SCO can bring 
better understanding between West Asian, East Asian and South Asian countries.  These 
alliances can provide a regional solution to the complicated problem of Afghanistan,  
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which may be more acceptable to the broader grouping of RCP.  Other stakeholders such 
as Russia and China can also increase the degree of influence in ways that may draw the 
RCP closer rather than divide them. 
Ultimately, the SCO can become an effective forum to address security, economic 
and political concerns of all the regional players.  According to Daryl Morini, “Viewed 
objectively, seeking a rapprochement with the SCO should be a central pillar of any 
Western diplomatic strategy aimed at leaving Afghanistan on favorable terms.”133 The 
SCO is one organization that already exists in this region, having most of the greater 
Central Asian and South Asian countries as members or observers in this group. In the 
past, it has shown the resolve to overcome regional issues and gain the confidence of the 
regional players. It has been dominated by the great powers like Russia and China and at 
times has had a thinly veiled antagonism toward the West, but can still play a role in 
facilitating dialogue and resolving issues between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and India.  
This organization can assist in influencing both India and Pakistan, through Russia and 
China respectively, to move beyond their security concerns, develop confidence building 
measures, and work conjointly for a regional solution. This sort of organization should be 
encouraged by the United States without considering it as counterweight or ‘asymmetric 
balancing’134 against U.S. interests in the region.  
2. Good Governance and Strong Leadership (Pakistan – Afghanistan) 
In countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan, strong and sincere leadership is the 
single most important factor that can prevent fragmentation and radicalization of these 
societies, where patriarchal and patrimonial rules have destroyed all institutions.135  The 
rulers in these countries, like most third world countries, follow the politics of survival 
rather than the politics of rule.136  Continued engagement from the United States should 
work to strengthen the civilian leadership in order for them to gain greater authority and 
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legitimacy.  The opposite can happen though if the civilian leadership resist change and 
hold onto previous methods and policies.  Ultimately, this is something that only Pakistan 
and Afghan leaders can do for themselves, the ability to engender trust and confidence by 
suffering with the population without any foreign stamp is essential.  The United States 
and other partners walk a fine line between being a help or a hindrance.  Those leaders, 
who have less credibility at home, are a liability for international partners as well, as they 
can betray their powerful mentors and supporters for their own survival,137 and when 
their demise is imminent they blame others for their fall.  
The United States should take care to engage strong and legitimate leadership in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran without propping up self-centered dictators or corrupt 
civilians.  According to Bruce Riedel, “Strong military-military and intelligence-to-
intelligence networks are vital for an effective engagement approach, though it must 
avoid circumventing political leadership.”138  The short-term benefits of working with 
leaders like Pakistan’s Zia and Musharaf left few other options, but in the long-term 
created another set of problems and difficulties down the road. 
3. Local Initiatives 
The government of Afghanistan is the key player in supporting regional and local 
arrangements.  In the game of power politics for keeping a hold on the presidency, Karzai 
might be prepared to accept Taliban participation at the local and even national level.  
Encouraging regional mediation of leaders and instituting certain reforms would facilitate 
this integration.  While the Taliban are not likely to consider a settlement until after the 
exit of ISAF forces, a broader devolution of power across the provinces is appropriate to 
empower the local rule of law and ability to govern regardless of the Taliban or any other 
party.  This speaks to the concern that undue influence from the national level is spoiling 
the sincere efforts of regional and provincial governors.  
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Some have suggested a return to the pre-1970 form of governance with a 
federation of sorts among the provinces and a loose mandate from the national level.  At 
this point, such a severe reversal seems unlikely, as does the suggestion of partitioning 
areas to Taliban rule but keeping them beholden to Kabul.  These previous conditions are 
no longer viable because of the level of development currently in place.  Instead, the 
options are becoming fewer and fewer to the point that the best negotiable option for the 
Taliban is to avow allegiance to Afghanistan’s elected government and then try to 
influence the system from the inside out.  This sort of arrangement can be supervised by 
the regional organizations (SCO and ECO) and the United Nations. 
While the United States seeks to provide provincial autonomy to different 
ethnically divided provinces, any efforts to divide or quarantine Taliban areas from the 
rest of Afghanistan or create a firewall139 would spread chaos over the whole region. 
Former U.S. Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwell, suggested the de facto partition of 
Afghanistan.  According to Blackwell, the Pashtun majority areas (Pashtunistan) of East 
Afghanistan should be isolated and cordoned off from rest of Afghanistan.140 He further 
suggests that drone technology and special forces should be enough to quarantine and 
police that area, so that terrorism should remain restricted to those parts of the region. 
However, the suggested solution is likely to create further destabilization not only in 
Afghanistan, but South and Central Asia as well. The creation of a Pashtun `killing zone` 
in Afghanistan will affect Pakistan`s Pashtuns in the FATA, Khyber Pasthunkhwa, and 
Baluchistan. Such a plan will spillover instability and extremism along Pakistan`s border 
with China, Iran, India and Afghanistan. The Durand Line 141 will disappear as the 
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indicated zone extends east and southwards from Afghanistan. Therefore, the plan will 
not only destabilize Afghanistan but also expand into neighboring states.  
The need for reconciliation must allow for the consideration of Taliban concerns 
yet not create conditions that might broaden the conflict in the region.  Participation in 
the local political structure can make the Taliban stakeholders in the process and 
responsible for legitimate functions of the system, rather than disrupters. 
4. Economic Convergence 
The primary force that now drives relations and rivalries among the global and 
regional powers is economics.142  Most of the liberal economists think that economic 
interdependence is a positive sum game. This aspect is true to a greater extent, because 
during the rise of the Asian tigers in the early 1990s, mostly all of the countries of 
Southeast Asia showed remarkable signs of progress and prosperity within a decade.  
Similarly, the economic rise of India and China can have a positive spillover in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. The most effective investments for improving Afghanistan’s economy 
may well be achieved by assisting its neighbors and giving them a stronger stake in 
Afghanistan’s success. 
5. Modern Silk Route (MSR) 
David Ignatius and Thomas Barnett have made the same argument that “with 
trade and economic growth comes stability.”143  By opening the silk route between 
Central Asian countries and India, Afghanistan’s stability and peace might follow. 
Connecting Iran with India, Russia with Pakistan, and China with the Arabian Sea 
through Pakistan could knit together the rising powers of this region and make 
Afghanistan a hub rather than a barrier.  For Pakistan and Afghanistan, this strategy 
would have a transforming effect on their economy.  According to Fredrick Starr, “Indus 
valley civilization (Pakistan) would return to the status of a continental entrepot it 
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enjoyed from the Monhenjo- Daro age four millennium ago.”144  This strategy has been 
discussed before but never fully executed in order to determine its ultimate viability 
because of security concerns.  It is time to fully engage all parties in order to spur on this 
untapped resource. 
Consequently, the stakes for the United States in the reconnection of Eurasia, 
where Afghanistan is virtually at the epicenter, could not be higher.145  Other 
stakeholders, including the Central Asian Republics (CARs), China, Europe, India, Iran, 
Pakistan, Russia and Turkey, also have a very significant interest in the stabilization of 
Afghanistan. Many argue, logically, that these actors should take greater responsibility 
for the fate of Afghanistan because of regional proximity.  However, in this sense 
Afghanistan is a classic collective action problem.  Many of the states located close to 
Afghanistan view their interests in the country differently, and regard the actions of 
others as being suspicious.146  To the degree that their economic activity is 
interconnected, this suspiciousness would be degraded through familiarity.  And 
familiarity with each other could be achieved through increased trade and political 
interaction.  Rail systems, road networks, and pipelines could be the arteries that pump 
the lifeblood of economic prosperity throughout the region and benefit each of the RCP 
to the degree that their security concerns could be minimized. 
6. Regional Energy and Trade Agreements  
Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are each suffering from energy scarcity. Pakistan 
and India’s combined population is likely to reach more than two billion by 2050.  
Demand for energy is expected to rise exponentially in the coming years. Both India and 
Pakistan have adopted policies for using gas in future electrical generation projects.  This 
will increase the gas demand sharply and has generated interest in gas pipelines to 
facilitate imports from neighboring countries. India is one of the highest consumers of 
energy in the world. Similarly, the most powerful drivers of the expansion of 
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transcontinental Eurasian trade in the coming years will be the rapid growth of the Indian 
and Chinese economies.147  On the contrary, Central Asian states and Iran are energy-
rich countries, and Afghanistan is the most central route to connect the energy-starved 
booming economies with the resource-rich Central Asian countries.148 Gas pipelines like 
the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and India (TAPI) 
pipelines are a few of the cost effective and essential projects to improve life and the 
economy, along with confidence building of rival regional countries. Deepa M. Ollapally 
observes, “From the regional view point the U.S. resistance to a potential IPI natural gas 
pipeline is a huge stumbling block to one of the biggest confidence building measures 
imaginable in the troubled neighborhood.”149  However, it may be a means to extracting 
support from Iran in other areas of concern.   
No matter what type of economic activity is pursued, the risk of corruption 
remains high.  At every possible turn, degrees of transparency at the local and 
international levels must be established.  In the case of the Anyak copper mine, which 
China has committed to develop in Northeastern Afghanistan, the revenue from the mine 
will be deposited into an internationally monitored fund.  From inception, this openness 
was intended to curtail opportunities for bribes and fleecing of proceeds from the mine.  
Institutional transparency must be consciously employed in order to minimize corruption 
with massive economic growth. 
The flow of thousands of trucks from the Karachi port to Afghanistan, full of 
NATO supplies, through the most volatile Pashtun areas of the insurgency is 
manifestation of the power of economic activity even in the most risky part of the world. 
The flow of traffic through these areas has been economically beneficial for the local 
population; they in turn take ownership of security of these routes against the insurgents.  
According to Fredrick Starr, “As long as such economic incentive structures hold, local 
populations have shown themselves ready to prioritize commerce over political 
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violence.”150  Afghanistan's neighbors would be more likely to help contain the Taliban 
under a mutually beneficial trade agreement than under wartime conditions in which they 
want to avoid identification with an unpopular U.S. military presence.  
The primary goal is to rekindle the cooperative relationship that once existed 
among the RCP, however short-lived and tenuous it may have been.  The common goal 
of preventing radical rule in Kabul has a mutually beneficial interest for all the regional 
neighbors to include Pakistan.  If “trade agreements could lead to coordinated aid efforts 
and could encourage the neighbors to increase their economic assistance, then  these 
partners are more likely to provide large-scale aid if helping out supports their own 
interests in Kabul rather than merely reinforces a U.S.-dominated regime.”151 
Iran and India are already keenly interested in economic aid for Kabul and might 
carry a heavier load if other foreign aid is decreased. “Li Qinggong, deputy secretary-
general of the China Council for National Security Policy Studies, alluded to increased 
Chinese aid in a September 29, 2009, statement, which also envisioned talks on ’how to 
dispose of the forces of al-Qaeda‘ if and when the United States disengages.”152  Chinese 
investment in the northeastern copper mine is widely referenced but Russia too has 
stepped forward with aid package offers “to refurbish 140 Soviet-era hydroelectric 
stations, bridges, wells, and irrigation systems.”153  
More economic cooperation and trade agreements would lead to security 
agreements rather than thinking the other way around.  The agreement should include the 
RCP initially but should eventually expand to include other system players at the 
international level as well.  “Signatories would pledge to respect the country’s military 
neutrality, not to provide arms to warring factions, and to co-operate in UN enforcement 
of an arms ban.”154  The importance of a silk route strategy as a framework for 
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interconnecting the RCP to one another to strengthen economic ties and thereby mutual 
security issues is a much stronger position that could affect the plight of the lowest 
members of society as well as increase the national wealth of Afghanistan. 
G. MILITARY/SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
1. Noninterference in Afghanistan 
Before any regional solution can be initiated though, all the stakeholders must 
recognize the futility of the zero sum game that has been played out in Afghanistan over 
the past decade.   One such instance is when The Hamid Karzai provisional government, 
organized during The Bonn Agreement of December 2001,155 made careful note in 
Annex III to ask the United Nations to ‘guarantee' noninterference in Afghanistan's 
internal affairs.  This is a strong precedent and one that could be used as a basis for 
urging the Secretary-General of the United Nations today to continue fulfilling this 
obligation of regulation.   This could also ultimately lead to a regional summit to extract 
the same support from RCP to simply abide by this original UN agreement of 
noninterference in Afghan affairs.  If all the RCP started from the equal footing of 
noninterference, then moving forward simultaneously to the goal of mutual cooperation 
might be easier rather than dismissing some RCP based on their advantageous positions 
of influence.156  
There is also a sense of mixed anxiety about the ISAF’s intention to stay or go 
home.  This question looms even larger now that Osama Bin Laden was killed in May 
2011.  Some of the seventy-four U.S. bases in Afghanistan, including airfields, have 
already been transitioned completely to Afghan leaders and soldiers, but the large 
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presence at Bagram and Kandahar is projected to grow in the years ahead157—many see 
this as a mixed message and cannot determine what that means for the long term.  
Uncertainty in this case causes leaders to hedge their bets and act in their own best 
personal interests rather than the best Afghan interests.  Even if the end goal is simply 
access rather than permanent bases, then clearly articulating that could allay fears of the 
U.S. becoming too entrenched in the culture.   The perception is that Afghanistan and 
other nations want international allies close but not too close, and that is a good thing for 
handing over more reigns and responsibilities to the Afghans themselves and increasingly 
allowing the ISAF to be less prominent in both security and governance functions.158 
2. Resolving India–Pakistan Disagreements from West to East 
Efforts at regional diplomacy in order to bolster efforts to end the war should first 
focus on Pakistan and India, “with the aim of ensuring that a political settlement does not 
give rise to increased competition or zero sum behavior at Afghanistan’s expense.”159  
Pakistan’s serious concerns regarding encirclement by India through Afghan cooperation 
are enough (for Pakistan) to destabilize the region.  Likewise, India’s concern is that 
Islamabad may destabilize it through asymmetric means.  This zero sum competition can 
have no solution so long as the two engage in a “move-counter move-move” strategy.  
Alternatively, “a government in Kabul that is seen as not under the sway of either India 
or Pakistan provides the most stable outcome.”160 
Even more beneficial might be the normalization of Indian-Pakistan relations, but 
because that is not essential for stability, “a modest objective of an Afghanistan that is not 
viewed as under the sway of either India or Pakistan might be achievable if all parties can 
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be persuaded to take a few important steps.”161  Linda Robinson, a senior adviser to the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence at U.S. Central Command, offers four 
measures to move in this direction beginning with greater Indian transparency about 
actions within Afghanistan.  Next, the role of international players such as the United 
States should be maximized to counter Indian actions and put Pakistani concerns at ease.  
Third, Afghanistan can begin a formal demarcation process of the Durand Line and 
model its free flow of goods and people after the European structure that still has a strong 
identity of sovereignty and formal borders.  Finally, impress upon Pakistan, through other 
nations, the need to move beyond its perceived threat from India, as a result of Pakistan’s 
own nuclear deterrent capability.   This may be emphasized by conveyance of isolation, 
sanctions, or retribution if a terrorist attack emanates from Pakistani soil.162 
Rather than getting into the same stereotypical rhetoric of coercive measures 
against Pakistan, the U.S. needs to address Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns.  Other 
trust building measures might include, “opening U.S. markets to Pakistani textiles and 
other goods, promoting dialogue to resolve the Kashmir dispute with India, and offering a 
civil nuclear cooperation deal comparable to the one concluded with India, provided that 
Pakistan adequately addresses proliferation concerns.”163 
Similarly, the U.S. along with regional powers has an opportunity today to settle 
the grave issue of Kashmir in a better way. It is also in the interest of India to find a 
solution to this issue that has generated three full-scale wars between the two neighbors 
and brought great misery and chaos to more than a billion persons living on both sides of 
the border. If the United States can generate a solution to the Kashmir problem, it would 
gain true legitimacy in the eyes of Pakistanis and the greater Muslim world; moreover, it 
would have the opportunity to pressure Pakistan in giving up its alleged support for all 
terrorist groups, including the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network and Lashkar e Taiba 
among others.  After Osama Bin Laden’s death and alleged support by some elements of 
Pakistani intelligence, this option seems to have a better chance of gaining mutual trust 
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and addressing grievances of a key ally. It is not surprising that regardless of the amount 
of aid and assistance Pakistan receives, its motivation is still determined by what it 
perceives most important, which is the Kashmir and India situation.  All other concerns 
from the American perspective are secondary as long as it does not significantly 
undermine this primary objective. According to former United States PakAf 
representative Holbrooke, “A stable Afghanistan is not essential; a stable Pakistan is 
essential. He believed that a crucial step to reducing radicalism in Pakistan was to ease 
the Kashmir dispute with India, and he favored more pressure on India to achieve 
that.”164 
3. Time to Talk to the Taliban 
The roots of insurgency were set when the Taliban chose not to participate in the 
original Bonn negotiations of 2001.  Since that time, a degree of silent reintegration has 
proceeded with handfuls of Taliban commanders and fighters rejoining the government 
largely based on personal relations and assurances from trusted government officials.  
Larger movements toward talks have started and ended in fits with little effect.  There are 
prospects for hope though, starting with the efforts of President Karzai’s peace 
commission.  The commission has traveled widely among regional partners in an effort to 
extend an olive branch to the Taliban and encourage outside parties in neighboring 
countries to exert influence where possible.  Another recent development that may open a 
window to pursue discussions may be the recent death of Osama Bin Laden.  The 
Taliban’s decision to harbor the infamous leader of Al Qaeda was a primary point of 
conflict and with that obstacle removed, perhaps the Taliban can be assuaged to the 
bargaining table no longer bound by Pashtunwali obligations.  The time for reconciliation 
could never be more opportune from a U.S. perspective, which is looking to begin 
transition to Afghan forces in terms of security and governance.  If the recently 
established Taliban office in Ankara can facilitate any reconciliation or reintegration with  
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the moderate Taliban, that could make transition much easier and faster.  The United 
States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are already part of this peace process, but the fruits of 
their efforts are, as of yet, still undetermined.165 
One potential starting point from where to begin discussions is offered by Fareed 
Zakaria.  He argues that the goal of separating “as often as possible, the global jihadist 
from the accidental guerrilla,” warrants a conversation with all insurgents willing to 
forsake diehard opposition.166  Both sides surely understand the simple fact that not all 
Afghans who are fighting against ISAF forces are Taliban and not all Taliban for that 
matter are linked to Al Qaeda.  The more opportunities that can be created to broaden 
discussion between factions, the greater the possibility to find points of concurrence.  
Ultimately, as with all things, the solution must come from the Afghans themselves.  T.E. 
Lawrence famously recognized this point in Arabia, directing that the emphasis should be 
on helping the Arabs and not winning the war for them.  More recently retired Army 
Officer, Raymond Millen similarly noted in this same context, “that it is better for the 
Afghans to shoulder their responsibilities even if done imperfectly.”167 
4. Countering Narco-Terrorism 
Most experts rightly believe that the armed extremists in Afghanistan cannot be 
defeated without an effective opposition to drug production, which has increased forty 
times over since the beginning of the counterterrorist operations of 2001.  The drugs are 
the lifeblood which funds the insurgency but it is also a major source of economic 
livelihood for average Afghans as well.  The Taliban have exploited the economic 
hardship of the region to widely expand production and, in turn, the ability to fund 
operations.  Unfortunately this has also created a massive illicit economy that 
Afghanistan is unable to legitimately counter.  Thus, a portion of the population’s self-
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interest is greatly served by complicit support with no immediate means to reverse this 
cycle.  The catch-22 condition of the opium trade makes the problem all the more acute, 
but as long as this source of funding remains unhindered the insurgency will have 
incredible staying power. 
5. USA and China as Guarantors 
The U.S. has an enormous amount of influence and ability in this region to shape 
the agenda.  Still, this is sometimes insufficient and does not always achieve the desired 
end state.  The same may be said for China as well.  Notwithstanding the incredible 
potential for positive regional influence, countries such as Iran, Pakistan, and India act 
independently.  This assumes that just because the U.S. or China want something, other 
weaker or smaller nations will always concede. This is, of course, not the case and the 
level of backchannel operations in the region exemplifies the level of independence these 
countries maintain, especially in consideration of their perceived self-interests.  What the 
U.S. and China can do effectively, though, is act as a guarantor.  According to Thomas, 
“U.S. military dominance, backed by its ability to control economic rewards for those 
who oppose or support American policies, has relegated the character of the United 
Nations.”168  
Both Washington and Beijing have the ability to influence regional players and 
ensure conformity of treaties and pacts between the regional rivals. Beijing, being an 
immediate neighbour, has equally high stakes and in some instances better ability to act 
as an impartial negotiator at the regional level.  Both these countries can influence 
Pakistan, India and Iran by ensuring a regional alliance and helping to enforce 
agreements.  
H. RECOMMENDATIONS 
One recommendation is to accelerate the drawdown of U.S. security forces in 
conjunction with the transition of security missions to ASF.  This process has already 
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begun in some regions in order to meet the goal of complete transition by 2014.  Any 
opportunity to responsibly accelerate this transition before the final deadline should be 
exploited in order to break Afghan dependence on external support.  Politically, there is 
time to adjust if the transition hits stumbling blocks.  The same may not be true if 
transition remains slow.  In fact, the Osama development may even increase pressure 
within the U.S. to accelerate the transition of security responsibilities from the ISAF to 
Afghan forces.  An accelerated drawdown would also allay Russian, Chinese, Iranian, 
Pakistani, and Afghan population fears that Washington and its allies do not seek long-
term geopolitical and economic advantages by leaving behind a massive military 
footprint in Afghanistan.  A smaller specialized force would likely be more acceptable to 
regional interests, and in light of recent events, few could argue the effectiveness of these 
missions to pursue U.S. national interests.  Ultimately the speed of the withdrawal must 
be carefully balanced with the quality of the transition.  It is not simply a matter of 
reducing the number of U.S. or foreign troops, but visibly changing the nature of their 
mission and their popular perception.  This will, in effect, achieve an overall drawdown 
in the number of forces, but not spur greater instability. 
Another recommendation is that the U.S. should attempt to form a regional 
organization of states to foster cooperation and consideration of individual states’ 
concerns and interests.  Initially, the organization should include only the regional core 
players of Pakistan, Iran, and India.  This may expand with time to include other regional 
players such as China, Russia, the CARs, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, but initially, 
maintaining a small core contingent will make consensus easier and focus the group on 
the most immediate and pressing issues.  This will also focus the group and force 
priorities from the outset, which will increase the probability for success, upon which the 
group can build.  As one has seen, Russia–U.S., India-Pakistan, Iran-Pakistan, Iran–U.S., 
and to a lesser extent, India-China competition have all contributed to the perpetuation of 
war on Afghan soil. Thus, there is a dire need to first bring all of the external parties to 
the Afghan War around a common table to reach a minimum understanding of their 
common interests to facilitate the internal Afghan peace process.  
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Regional organizations like the ECO and SCO should take a proactive role in 
resolving regional issues and misunderstandings. The United States should encourage 
such agreements rather than being skeptical of ‘asymmetric balancing’ by China or 
Russia. These forums can ensure effective agreements against drug trafficking, cross-
border terrorism and demographic issues, as well as encourage long-term economic 
investment in the region and specifically in Afghanistan. 
Drug production and trafficking should be discouraged in order to minimize 
terrorist financing and arming.  Focused anti-drug operations will take funding from the 
insurgents and disassociate them from the populace who are exploited for their labor.  
Creation of a licit economy is essential for improving the political and economic health of 
the nation and ultimately providing a long-term, sustainable system. 
It would be a great achievement if India, Pakistan, and Iran could compete in a 
positive sum game to rebuild Afghanistan’s state and public infrastructure. The United 
States can lead this process and help these states avoid a zero sum game through 
confidence-building measures and trade agreements. Rather than playing politics or 
planning military adventurism, these countries should invest in human resource 
development and poverty alleviation measures through a strong economic plan for the 
region.  This is less a matter of nation building and more one of strengthening conditions 
to support long-term national interests. 
I would be beneficial to develop intercontinental transport and trade that includes 
roads, railways, pipes, and hydro-electric and hydro-carbon power.  Afghanistan is at the 
nexus of the Central and South Asia trading corridor.  The ISAF is uniquely positioned to 
execute this strategy.  “Afghanistan and its neighbors stand to benefit immensely from 
this trade through the collection of tariffs and the growing role of their own transit-related 
industries.”169  
America should take care to reduce the opportunity for free riders and increase the 
benefit for invested stakeholders.  Those nations who have sacrificed the most should feel 
that their efforts are effective; otherwise they will be continuously pushed toward zero 
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sum strategies trying to maximize self-interests.  This holds true for external regional 
players just as much as for internal factions such as the Taliban.  Greater numbers of 
Pashtun representation at the national level, in the civilian and military sectors, is 
essential to reconcile some of the primary grievances that fuel the Pashtun’s feelings of 
exclusion and isolation. 
I. CONCLUSION 
The list of problems facing Afghanistan is long, and for every one problem, there 
are a myriad of suggestions to begin to move things in a more positive direction.  It seems 
though that with every solution devised there is some other conflicting condition that 
causes a never-ending string of catch-22 situations.  Rather than stringing together a list 
of solutions tied to a list of problems, the key is to start small.  Build a base of success 
and growth, and then expand from there.  This starts first with the number of participants 
in the end state solution.  There are many concerned nations in the region but the focus 
should begin with only the most essential—the regional core players.  Among these 
players there should first be a focus on only the most central problems and their solutions.  
These broad categorical issues generally fall in the realm of political, security, and 
economic concerns, and specifically include the issues of foreign intervention, Taliban 
reconciliation, and Afghan capacity building.  These are the basis of a first step solution, 
and from there the long list of woes can be addressed. 
Among the many assets that the United States has in facilitating this first step 
solution is perhaps the image it can project as a security broker, able to subdue the 
infighting and distrust between the regional core players and Afghanistan. “In order to do 
so, the United States has to develop a regional policy that both reflects a long-term 
commitment and meets the interests and challenges facing Afghanistan and its 
neighbors.”170  This is where the issue of building Afghan capacity comes in.  Without 
doing it for them, the U.S. must find a way to help them help themselves.  “Fortunately, 
the Afghan government is working to provide the answer with the proposal of a transit 
and trade facilitation strategy that will serve the interests of Afghanistan’s sustainable 
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economic development as well as that of its neighbors.”171  This is an economic strategy 
that builds capacity in the Afghan infrastructure, which can translate to successes in many 
other areas. 
The political realm of problems and solutions is one that, from a regional 
perspective, can be very difficult.  There is such a complicated web of ancillary issues 
that involve the regional core players that it is often easy to become swallowed up by the 
problems that exist.  This is especially true in the case of India and Pakistan, but could be 
said for any other combination of regional core players.  In this situation, the case of 
internal intervention and large military presence poses a degree of concern for each of the 
neighboring countries.  As the move toward transition accelerates and this presence 
diminishes then politically the U.S. position strengthens.  This may seem 
counterintuitive, but in fact it shows a degree of understanding that will be more 
influential than the physical presence of thousands of troops could ever achieve.  For this 
reason, the accelerated transition from foreign troops to the Afghans must be prioritized 
as much as responsibly possible. 
Finally, the security dimension is one that has proven extremely problematic over 
the past decade, and one that could scuttle all the other efforts if not resolved.  
Reconciliation with the Taliban must be of the utmost importance, recognizing that 
political solutions are often necessary for successfully ending an insurgency.172  The 
sooner productive and meaningful reconciliation can be made with the Taliban, the 
sooner security concerns will subside, economic investments will expand and political 
changes can take hold to pacify and rebuild the region. 
There is a great deal of pressure that has been building with the impending arrival 
of the ten-year anniversary of the U.S. war on terror and the beginning of the current 
conflict in Afghanistan.  This pressure has altered the strategy of the U.S. in Afghanistan 
by hastening a surge in troop levels, and a comprehensive redirection of COIN operations 
throughout Afghanistan.  It is appropriate to examine the internal conditions of the 
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conflict that necessitated these redirections in the first place.  But on their own, these 
internal measures will not bring peace to Afghanistan.  The regional rebalancing of power 
through cooperation of the countries at the physical and systematic core of the problem is 
the key to both Afghan and regional stability.  Once these conditions are externally 
balanced from the outside, Afghanistan will be able to internally strengthen and break 
free from the cycle of conflict in which it has been entangled for more than thirty years.  
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VII. EPILOGUE:  SHOCKS 
States can cooperate, although cooperation is something difficult to 
achieve and always difficult to sustain. 173            John J. Mearsheimer 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The recommendations and solutions provided for stability and peace in 
Afghanistan are as complex as the history of Afghanistan.  The study of international 
relations reveals that there is rarely a “one size fits all” defined solution, and future 
conditions are often unpredictable and uncertain.  Like the terrible storms and calamities 
of nature, man-made calamities can change the course of history, and one never knows 
how these actions may change or develop until the moment arrives. 
The complex and crosscutting nature of competitions between the regional players 
around Afghanistan is testimony to the fact that, while stability in Afghanistan is 
achievable, it is also very fragile.  Any compromise and cooperation between the regional 
core players (RCP) is extremely vulnerable to developments that may shock the delicate 
balance of power.  According to Grieco, “Two factors inhibit cooperation: considerations 
about relative gains and concerns about cheating.”174 The air of skepticism and distrust 
may be overcome to a degree, but it also remains possible that the slightest shock could 
knock the RCP off their tenuous ledge of stability.  The United States and other nations 
have great capacity to facilitate the peace process and may also act an effective shock 
absorber, but just as these shocks are unpredictable their results are equally undefined.  
B. FRAGILE STABILITY 
There are numerous “what if” scenarios that could be potentially destabilizing to a 
fragile peace in Afghanistan and the region.  Some might be imaginable and others 
completely unexpected.  In recent months, two such examples are the raid to kill Osama 
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Bin Laden and the Arab Spring across the Middle East.  As the most wanted terrorist in 
the world, it was not beyond the range of possibilities that Osama Bin Laden would 
eventually be found or killed by U.S. forces.  The Middle East protests and the resulting 
regime changes, on the other hand, came rather unexpectedly and few would have 
envisioned the powerful changes that mostly peaceful protests could elicit.  The 
difference between the unimagined and the possible is that by simply considering the 
possible, one can develop courses of action for a future scenario. While the authors do 
not offer solutions for these shocks here, it is nonetheless helpful to consider the effects 
of such to provide perspective for planners as they consider the future plans and policies 
in terms of the efforts and actions currently being employed in Afghanistan and the 
greater region.  Some of those shocks might include: 
• Military attacks against Iranian nuclear installations 
• A larger Mumbai-type attack in India 
• Karzai coup or assassination 
• Use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in a Western nation 
• Complete loss of rapport with Pakistan 
1. Attack Against Iranian Nuclear Installations 
With American forces heavily committed in Afghanistan and having a 
diminishing presence in Iraq, along with the growing concern in Libya, the chance of 
attack against an Iranian nuclear installation by the U.S. seems quite remote.  However, a 
state such as Israel could decide to act unilaterally, in which case the region may see a 
dramatic change in the current situation.  Iran’s direct response to Israel would surely be 
an element of concern, but indirectly, Iran’s reaction might also be to increase support of 
the insurgency in Afghanistan.  This approach would give Iran recourse against the U.S., 
which they ultimately view as a pro-Israeli enabler regardless of the situation in this 
particular attack.  An increase in the insurgency may also jeopardize the ability of Karzai 
to govern in Afghanistan and stress Iranian–Afghan relations, as Afghanistan is 
ultimately a beneficiary of U.S. assistance.  The Iranian support of insurgency in Iraq was 
a problematic aspect of the fight there, and may also cause conditions in Afghanistan to 
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further boil over, if the Iranians were given reason to become more involved.  Such 
involvement could also be manifest in other efforts to derail the peace process or poison 
the talks with the Taliban.  Such an event would likely increase tensions wildly 
throughout the region and not just in Afghanistan. 
2. Terrorist Attack in India 
There have been repeated entreaties to Pakistan by both American and British 
leaders to prevent a Mumbai-style attack against India.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Admiral, Mike Mullen, told reporters travelling with him on his way to India: 
"One of the things that struck me then, and is still a great concern, is how 10 terrorists 
could drive two nuclear-armed nations closer to conflict."175 In a visit to India, U.S. 
Defense Secretary Gates expressed concern about the effects of groups in Al-Qaeda's 
syndicate, such as the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the Pakistan-based 
Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba.  He said that such groups posed a danger as a whole, as 
they are trying “to destabilize not just Afghanistan, not just Pakistan, but potentially the 
whole region by provoking a conflict perhaps between India and Pakistan through some 
provocative act.”176 Such an event could provoke India to launch surgical strikes inside 
Pakistan against alleged terrorist camps in the Punjab and Pakhtunkwa provinces, 
increasing tensions between the nuclear rivals.  Pakistan could also withdraw key forces 
supporting ISAF cross-border operations from their western front to counter anticipated 
Indian buildups in the east.  This could also interrupt NATO supplies via Karachi and 
reinvigorate Pakistani interest in elements that could counter Indian actions in 
Afghanistan, from which the Pakistanis may feel threatened as conflict resumes with 
India. 
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3. Karzai Coup or Assassination 
Since his selection to head the transitional government following the Bonn 
Agreements, the U.S. has had a mixed relationship with President Karzai.  Despite the 
political difficulties though, President Karzai has prevailed in two national elections and 
is the face of Afghanistan’s democracy—good, bad, or indifferent.  His assassination 
would obviously be tragic, but in terms of political upheaval a coup could possibly be 
even worse.  Such an event would call into question the validity of all the efforts of the 
international community to create a stable democracy in such an unstable region.  Talking 
about Karzai, Derek Harvey, the Director for the Center of Excellence for CENTCOM 
stated, “He’s a very strong president in a weak system, and we’ve assumed for too long 
that he’s a weak leader in a weak system.”177 The U.S. has ultimately decided that the 
integrity of the system bears more importance than the person in the job.  Thus, a coup 
would be an affront to that democratic system and be more detrimental in the long run 
than the short-term effects of an assassination.  On the other hand, many feel that a 
different leader guiding the fragile Afghan system would be preferred to the allegedly 
corrupt cadre atop the government now. 
4. Use of a WMD in a Western Nation 
The detonation of a nuclear device by a terrorist group in any of the major 
Western cities would be a massive shock.  According to President Obama, it would be “a 
potential game changer.”178  Some suspect that Al Qaeda already has the capability but 
has been reticent to use it.  Perhaps the killing of Bin Laden will change that or elicit 
another spectacular attack as Al Qaeda has threatened.  In any case, the concern with a 
WMD would be the origin of the device.  If that were to lead to Pakistan, for example, 
the dynamics of the region would be understandably altered.  In a 2008 meeting between 
the National Security Advisor, Gen. Jones, and Pakistani President Zardari, Jones spoke 
soberly about such an event.  “No one will be able to stop the response and 
consequences,” although he stopped short of stating that the response might consist of 
                                                 
177 Woodward, Obama’s Wars, 347. 
178 Woodward, Obama’s Wars, 363. 
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escalated attacks against “up to 150 known terrorist safe havens inside Pakistan.”179 
Potential attacks inside of Pakistan may take the sovereignty questions going on now to a 
new level, but unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan has the means to counter an attack 
on its sovereignty and may react with both aerial and ground defenses.  If that were to 
happen, would China and India feel compelled to intervene?   
The introduction of a nuclear weapon to the situation, by a non-state actor, could 
be so destabilizing that it is difficult to imagine how that would reverberate throughout 
the region, and harkens back to the uncertain and trying times of the Cold War and near 
nuclear confrontations that nearly occurred.  If establishing stability in Afghanistan has 
been difficult with Pakistan as a partner, then how much more difficult would it be if the 
Pakistan-U.S. relationship were to irreparably fracture?  Truly, a Pakistan- sourced WMD 
attack would shock the stability of the region. 
5. Complete Loss of Rapport With Pakistan 
There are echoing concerns from Congress and the White House about Pakistan’s 
active role in providing a safe haven to Al Qaeda.180 After the successful attack against 
Bin Laden, the U.S. may be even more emboldened to conduct similar cross-border 
operations to further target Al Qaeda leadership.  Both the United States and Pakistan 
have shown measured control in handling the situation, especially considering other 
recent upheavals in their relationship.  Two other recent bombshells included the 
WikiLeaks revelations that trumpeted U.S. suspicions about Pakistan’s complicit support 
of insurgents in Afghanistan, and the Raymond Davis incident in which a CIA contractor 
shot and killed two alleged thieves at a busy traffic stop in Lahore but were later believed 
to be Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) operatives.  As previously mentioned, the leadership 
in Pakistan is caught in a difficult bind, as both the United States and the Pakistani public 
are asking questions regarding the presence of Osama, and also about the details of an 
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180 Richard Simon and Michael Muskal, “U.S. Turns Attention Toward Pakistan After Osama bin 
Laden’s Death,” Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, May 3, 2011), 
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unauthorized raid inside a sovereign country without any reaction from the Pakistani 
Military (PAKMIL).  It would seem that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is truly being 
pushed to its limits and one must question what would happen if it finally reaches a 
breaking point.  If the events of the last year have not been enough to completely fracture 
relations, it may be a sign that the bond is unbreakable, able to endure any stress.  If there 
were a catastrophic loss of rapport between the U.S. and Pakistan for any number of 
reasons, it would seem that this shock could be one of the most damaging to the region at 
large, because it would serve to divide primary partners when cooperation is so 
imperative to the process of stability.   
C. CONCLUSION 
Pakistan has an incredible ability to influence the conditions in Afghanistan and 
the region at large.  As expressed by an adept Pakistani lawyer, “It is time to publicly 
articulate our legitimate security interests linked to the future of Afghanistan and develop 
a regional consensus around it.”181 There is little tolerance to withstand shocks of any 
kind throughout the region, and so the sooner relations can be shored up and 
improvements made in every facet, the better it will be for everyone involved.  In the 
past, cooperation among the regional partners has seemed to be an intolerable option, but 
after continued competition over the past decade and worsening conditions for all the 
regional partners, more of the same seems equally intolerable.  The time has come for an 
end to the regional intransience, and while this may not the best possible solution for any 






                                                 
181 Babar Sattar, “Time For Heads to Roll,” Dawn.com, May 8, 2011, 
http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/08/time-for-heads-to-roll.html (accessed on 05/09/2011). 
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APPENDIX A. GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF KARZAI’S 
DILEMMA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After nine years of intervention in Afghanistan, the situation is still largely 
unstable and there are many questions about both the root causes of the problem and the 
best solution to move forward. The inability of both the intervening foreign forces and 
the national government to provide security and justice to the Afghan people has severely 
undermined each other’s legitimacy.  This has in turn created rifts between the national 
government and intervention forces, and between the national government and its own 
people.  Regional neighbors view this instability with concern and in the vain of self-
preservation and national interests, each act individually to achieve its own best options.  
The Taliban (TB) recognizes these rifts and further exploits them by framing their 
actions as a rejection of foreign occupation.  As freedom fighters, in some regions the TB 
engender greater public support because they appear more credible and more legitimate 
than government forces.  In this sense, public support is more important and valuable 
than external support in maintaining the insurgency over the last decade. 
To understand Karzai’s situation, one needs to consider the effect of the continued 
presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, and how that influences his dealings with his 
own government, neighboring countries, the international community, and competing 
forces such as the Taliban.  
B. GAME SETUP 
The game describes the strategies pursued by both Karzai and the Taliban, where 
both are seeking similar ends of power and control as well as a liberated Afghanistan. 
The game explains the different approaches for the two players to achieve their goals and 
tries to examine how these approaches have exacerbated Karzai’s fears and strengthened 
the Taliban’s strategies. The game also demonstrates the environmental effects on the 
players and how this may have shaped the players’ actions. 
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Regarding control, Karzai is trying to maintain his influence and governmental 
control but must rely on foreign forces to enforce and sustain his administration.  The 
Taliban on the other hand is attempting to regain control, having lost it following their 
demise at American hands.  For each of the players there are advantages and 
disadvantages.  While Karzai has greater control, the support of foreign forces decreases 
his popular legitimacy.  The Taliban have less control but their resistance to foreign 
forces often strengthens their popular support.    
The situation described above will be common to any element that assumes 
national authority in Afghanistan, where the lack of national identity dictates conflicting 
loyalties.  The social construct is largely responsible for stirring rivalry, and tribal politics 
plays a crucial role in shaping domestic politics.  The struggle for the ruling party is to 
integrate the alienated groups and different fractions to garner sufficient national unity 
without losing basic tribal support and legitimacy. 
C. THE GAME’S ASSUMPTIONS AND RULES 
1. Assumptions 
a. Both players are rational players. 
b. The game is conducted with imperfect information, i.e., neither player 
knows the other player’s action/strategy in advance. 
c. Both players seek to maximize their own status by increasing their 
respective payoffs. 
2. Rules 
a. The two main strategies for Karzai are to pursue control or not to pursue 
control.  The other is to accept external support from the U.S. or reject 
such support. 
b. The Taliban also seeks control or not to pursue control.  Secondly they too 
must decide to work with, or reject external U.S. support. 
c. The game uses ordinal scaling. 
d. Scoring:  
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i. The best option is ranked by four (4) points on the scale. 
ii. The second best option is ranked by three (3) points on the scale. 
iii. The second worst option is ranked by two (2) points on the scale. 
iv. The worst option is ranked by one (1) point on the scale. 
D. BASIC GAME 
The basic game strategies are presented in Figure 38; they manifest the players’ 
available options and strategies. The assigned values are presented thereafter. 
 
Figure 38.   Game Strategies with Descriptions 
1. Karzai’s Options 
4 Best Option: To have all the authority, control, and power of the state 




perceived as a patriotic liberator who, from the depths of a refugee camp in Pakistan, 
managed to ascend to the presidency responsible for ending foreign presence and the 
radical Taliban regime.   
3 Next Best Option: To have all the authority and power of the state, yet 
operate under the influence of foreign forces.  The foreign actors provide the means for 
him to maintain this status and security, which degrades popular support but he still 
maintains his position and stature.  This is essentially the present situation, which is 
excellent for Karzai, but because it is not optimal for other players as the game expands, 
it will ultimately not be sustainable in the long-term. 
2 Next Worst Option:  To lose authority and power of the national 
government.  There is no foreign presence to guarantee security but he is not viewed as 
illegitimate for supporting a foreign presence.   
1 Worst Option: Karzai loses control and authority within the Afghan 
national government.  There is an active foreign presence to guarantee security but this 
presence also jeopardizes his legitimacy with the populace.  
2. Taliban’s Options 
4 Best Option:  To see Karzai lose control of the government and have no 
threat of foreign presence to inhibit their contest for control.  They maintain popular 
support by opposing foreign presence and ousting Karzai, the illegitimate leader.  
3 Next Best Option:  Taliban takes control from Karzai, yet a foreign 
presence remains and their movement is unthreatened.  
2 Next Worst Option:  Karzai maintains control with no foreign occupation.  
Karzai would have greater legitimacy and thus would make it harder for the Taliban to 
take control.  
1 Worst Option:  Karzai has strong control but there is also a foreign 
presence.  This makes it difficult to wrestle control away from Karzai and there is a 
foreign occupation that must be resisted as well.  This causes an extremely heightened 
sense of insecurity for the Taliban.  
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Table 15.   Karzai Dilemma Values 
3. Game Solution 
a. Nash Equilibrium 
The strategic moves of the two players without communications, presented 
in the movement diagram below, demonstrate the likely outcome from the players’ 
rational choices to maximize their payoffs.    
 
Figure 39.   The Movement Diagram. 
The movement diagram suggests that Karzai’s dominant strategy is to 
pursue his control always, while the Taliban’s dominant strategy is to resist occupation 
and proceed with their insurgency always. The Nash equilibrium is (2, 4) where Karzai 
pursues control and the Taliban resists occupation.  Figure 40 shows the game payoff 
polygon and Nash equilibrium point. 
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Figure 40.   The Payoffs Polygon 
b. Strategic Moves 
Karzai’s dilemma game without communications reveals that both players 
will pursue their dominant strategies, which will eventually lead to the equilibrium point.  
Next, the authors will examine what will happen if the lines of communications are 
opened and the players have the ability to communicate.  A strategic move analysis is 
demonstrated below to determine if any of the players has a threat or a promise or a 
combination of both, which, if communicated, would alter their payoffs or reduce the 
other player’s payoffs.     
4. Karzai 
a. First Move: Karzai  
i. If Karzai pursues his control strategy, then the Taliban will choose 
no-occupation with payoffs (2, 4). 
ii. If Karzai does not choose control, then the Taliban will pursue no-
occupation with payoffs (4, 2). 
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iii. Karzai in this case can secure a better payoff by pursuing his 
control strategy and gets his best option of the likely outcome (2, 
4).  
b. Threat: Karzai 
i. Karzai does not want the TB to pursue their likely strategy of “no-
occupation;” therefore, Karzai places his threat on the TB’s no-
occupation strategy. 
ii. Normally: If the TB plays no-occupation, Karzai plays control with 
payoffs (2, 4) 
iii. Threat: If the TB plays no-occupation, Karzai will not pursue his 
control strategy, which will credit the TB a higher payoff of 4, 
while Karzai will get 2, and the final payoffs will be (4, 2) 
iv. The threat hurts Karzai, but it does not hurt the TB, which means it 
is not a threat. Therefore, Karzai does not have a threat.   
c. Promise: Karzai 
i. Karzai wants the TB to play their unlikely occupation strategy; 
therefore, Karzai’s promise will be on the TB’s occupation 
strategy. 
ii. Normally: If the TB plays occupation then Karzai plays control 
with payoffs of (1, 3). 
iii. Promise: If the TB plays occupation then Karzai will play no-
control with payoffs (3, 1). 
iv. The promise hurts Karzai and benefits the TB; therefore, Karzai 
has a promise that works alone but leaves him with his worst 
option. 
The threat and promise combination is not available for Karzai. 
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5. The Taliban (TB) 
a. First Move: The TB 
i. If the TB pursues U.S. strategy Karzai will choose control with 
payoffs (1, 3). 
ii. If the TB chooses no-occupation then Karzai will pursue control 
with payoffs (2, 4). 
iii. The TB in this case can secure a better payoff by pursuing their no-
occupation strategy and get their third best option “the likely 
outcome” (2, 4). 
b. Threat: The TB 
i. The TB does not want Karzai to pursue his likely control strategy; 
therefore, the TB places their threat on Karzai’s control strategy. 
ii. If Karzai plays control the TB plays no-occupation with payoffs (2, 
4) 
iii. Threat: If Karzai plays control the TB will pursue their occupation 
strategy, which will reduce Karzai’s payoff (1, 3). 
iv. The threat hurts the TB and hurts Karzai, which means it is a 
threat. Therefore, the TB has a threat but does not work alone since 
Karzai can secure 4 by playing his control strategy.    
c. Promise: The TB 
i. The TB want Karzai’s “no-control” strategy; therefore, the promise 
will be on Karzai’s no-control strategy. 
ii. Normally: If Karzai plays no-control then the TB plays no-
occupation with payoffs of (4, 2). 
iii. Promise: If Karzai plays no-control then the TB will play 
occupation with payoffs (3, 1). 
iv. The promise hurts the TB but does not benefit Karzai; therefore the 
TB does not have a promise. 
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The threat and promise combination is not available for the TB either. 
Neither the threat nor the promise option work for either player, which 
implies that, even with communication, both players cannot secure better payoffs.  “In 
this situation, it is strongly recommended to look at the players’ security levels and their 
prudential strategies.”182  The security level technique is a method to determine the 
minimal payoff that a player can secure by playing his prudential strategy.  It gives a fare 
indication of the player’s game value.  “By playing the prudential strategy, a player can 
assure that the least he gets is his security level, if his opponents choose to hold his 
payoffs down.”183  
6. Security Level Solution  
When both Karzai’s and the TB’s games are extracted, one can find the security 
levels from the prudential strategy. 
a. Karzai: Prudential Strategy—Solution 
a. Karzai's game: Karzai is maximizing “mini-max” while the TB is 
minimizing “maxi-min,” the opponent's payoff.  
b. It is a game with Karzai's payoffs, and has a pure strategy solution. 
c. Table 16 shows Karzai’s game: 
d. Karzai has a pure prudential strategy to play control whenever the 
TB plays occupation. See Figures 41 and 42. 







                                                 
182 Philip Straffin defines the prudential strategy in a non-zero sum game by the player’s optimal 
strategy in his game; moreover, he defines the player’s security level by the value of the player’s game. For 
more read, Philip Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy. 
183 Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, 69.  
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Table 16.   Karzai’s Game 
 
Figure 41.   TB Minimizing Strategy 
 
Figure 42.   Karzai Maximizing Strategy 
b. The TB: Prudential Strategy—Solution 
a. The TB's game: the TB is maximizing ‘mini-max” while Karzai is 
minimizing “maxi-min,” the opponent's payoff. 
b. It has become a zero sum game with the TB’s payoffs. 
c. Table 17 shows the TB’s game: 
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d. The TB has a pure prudential strategy to play no-occupation 
whenever Karzai plays control. See Figures 43 and 44. 
e. The security level is X=2; the value of the game is 2. Figure 45 
shows the security levels; the red line represents Karzai security 
level and the blue represents the Taliban.  
 
Table 17.   The TB’s Game 
 
 
Figure 43.   TB Maximizing Strategy 
 
 
Figure 44.   Karzai Minimizing Strategy 
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Figure 45.   The Players’ Security Levels 
7. The Equilizing Strategy 
The following solution explores what will happen, if the players try to equilize 
each other in order to get equal payoffs, which will put the game in a stable equilibrium 
status. 
a. Karzai: Equalizing Strategy—Solution 
a. The TB game: Karzai is equalizing while the TB is maximizing.  
b. It is a zero sum game with the TB payoffs. 
c. Table 18 shows the game: 














Table 18.   Karzai’s Game 
 
 
Figure 46.   Karzai Equalizing Strategy. 
b. TB: Equalizing Strategy—Solution 
a. Karzai's game: Karzai is maximizing while the TB is equalizing. 
b. It has become a zero sum Game with Karzai’s payoffs. 
c. Karzai has a pure dominant strategy to play control whenever the 








Table 19.   TB’s Game 
 
 
Figure 47.   TB Equalizing Strategy.  
The above calculations of the security level show the prudential strategy and the 
equalizing strategy.  The players’ status quo is (2, 3) and the Nash equilibrium point is (2, 
4).  The status quo suggests that Karzai can secure a minimum payoff of 3, his second 
best, if the Taliban try to hold his payoffs down, while Taliban cannot secure more than 
their second worst with a value of 2 if Karzai tries the same.  This shows that the Taliban 
are in a weaker position than Karzai, which mainly comes as a result of the support and 
protection Karzai receives from occupation forces. The results also explain that Karzai 
cannot get to his best option without giving some of his control to the Taliban and turn 




undermining Karzai and his government.  This situation manifests Karzai’s dilemma, 
where he cannot improve his situation without losing his powers and turning against his 
allies. 
8. Nash Arbitration 
Neither Karzai nor the Taliban can improve by departing unilaterally from the 
conservative strategy Nash equilibrium.  Moreover, the game solution suggests that the 
Nash equilibrium point, which is not Pareto optimal, is on the negotiation set.  The line 
that connects points (2, 4) and (4, 2) is at, or above, security levels. The Pareto optimal 
concept means that the players still can improve their payoffs by another outcome. The 
previous solution also declares that while the Taliban seems to be in a weaker position, 
Karzai has more incentive to change his payoffs due to time limitations and his own 
moral dilemma. 
The negotiation set in this case represents a suitable bargaining point for both 
players to improve their payoffs.  The Taliban, as a weaker player, can negotiate on 
control but it is unrealistic to expect that they would reduce their payoffs below their 
security level and accept occupation; however, Karzai has a good negotiation point that 
may enable him to bargain and improve his payoffs.  To do that, Karzai may offer a side 
payment, or essentially a bribe, to incentivize the Taliban to be more cooperative.  The 
problem with this reasoning is that it advises Karzai to go against occupation to enhance 
his payoff, which is an unrealistic option that resembles the core of the problem.  
However, recently a notable change in Karzai’s attitude and an understandably pragmatic 
shift toward the Taliban has developed in which Karzai is more critical of foreign forces 
and more sympathetic toward the Taliban.184 
The new arbitrary outcome and payoffs “Nash point” for the players can be 
calculated by the following equations, which are demonstrated in Figure 48, and depicts 
the Nash point algebraic method and calculations.  Also Figure 49 shows algebraic 
calculations of mixed strategies.   
                                                 
184 Alissa J. Rubin, “Karzai’s Words Leave Few Choices for the West,” New York Times, April 4, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/05/world/asia/05karzai.html (accessed on 05/22/2011). 
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Nash Point   (X+ b/2│M│, Y+ b/2) 
where,  
X and Y are the security levels, 
M is the slop of the Pareto optimal line, 
b is the height of the triangle. 
 
 
Figure 48.   Nash Point Algebraic Method and Calculations 
 
 
Figure 49.   Nash Arbitration Calculations and Algebraic Demonstration. 
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The Nash point is (2.5, 3.5), which shows an improvement in the players’ payoffs. 
To reach the new point, Karzai should play 25% of the time no-control and 75% control, 
while the Taliban should continue playing 100% of the time no-Occupation. The previous 
piece of information supports the assessment that Karzai will try to integrate Pashto 
(Taliban sympathizers) in his government without losing his control to enhance his 
payoffs; in contrast, this will not happen unless he moves against the occupation on the 
negotiation line.  The Taliban should insist on their  no-occupation strategy which will 
ultimatily improve their payoffs.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The game supports the general assessment demonstrated as Karzai’s dilemma. 
While Karzai can improve his payoffs in the game by resisting the occupation and 
gaining increased national legitimacy, the reality suggests that by doing so, Karzai 
undermines his control.  He understands that he cannot depend on his security forces to 
provide the minimum level of security needed to maintain the state’s monopoly of 
violence, defend its border, or confront the Taliban, so he is dependent on foreign 
support.  Karzai knows that while he can depend on the occupation forces to protect his 
status, he actually cannot rely on them to enhance his declining legitimacy, and for this 
reason he defaults back to familial and tribal relations.  For all his Western associations, 
education, and familiarity, he still recognizes he is Pashtun first, Afghani second, and a 
player on the international stage third.  For Karzai the price is high; if he leaves office 
before the occupation, it means he may spend the rest of his life in Dubai.  In contrast, the 
Taliban do not have the same time value, as they have already prepared themselves for a 
long protracted war.  The Taliban are basically trying to outlast their foreign foes and 
increase the costs that the foreign forces must assume.  The Taliban are now at their 
security level and realize one of their greatest strengths, which is no one can lead the 
country without the Pashtun majority.  Nearly ten years of conflict confirms this reality 
and if things are going to change from this course it will require bold adjustments.  Not 
only must things change from within Afghanistan such as reducing corruption, but the 
external and regional conditions must also change. 
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APPENDIX B. LINEAR PROGRAMMING FOR PHASE II 
The Influence in Afghanistan Game’s Mathematical Calculations 
Phase II 
The Coalitions Payoffs Division 
 
Let us assume that the decision variables are X1, X2, and X3, which are defined as 
follows: 
X1= India, and the unilateral game value for X1 is V(X1) = 8 
X2=Iran, and the unilateral game value for X2 is V(X2) = 7 
X3= Pakistan, and the unilateral game value for X3 is V(X3) = 9. 
 
 
Table 20.   Possible Coalition Structures and their Respective Payoffs 
Let us assume that we have the function Z, which describes the possible 
coalition’s payoffs from the previous game, where Z (Xi) = V (Xi). The function Z is 
subject to the following constraints shown below:  
V(X1+X2+X3) =17 
V(X1+X2) = 9 
V(X2+X3) = 13 
V(X1+X3) = 12 
V(X1) < = 8 
V(X2) < = 7 
V(X3) < = 9, where all V(X1), V(X2), V(X3) > = 0 “non-negativity.”  
To find the maximum payoffs the players can receive under the previous 
constraints, we need to find the maximum value of the function Zi, (Max. Zi) for all Xi, 
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where i=1, 2, 3, which represents the coalitions’ payoffs. The coalition description 
according to the function Z is illustrated below. 
• Z1 represents - the ideal coalition Z1(X1+X2+X3) =V(X1+X2+X3) 
• Z2 represents - India and Iran coalition against Pakistan, where Z2(X1+X2) 
= V(X1+X2) 
• Z3 represents - Iran and Pakistan coalition against India, where Z3(X2+X3) 
=V(X2+X3) 
• Z4 represents - India and Pakistan coalition against Iran, where Z4(X1+ X3) 

























































































































Table 21.   The Coalition’s Payoffs Division Among the Three RCP 
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APPENDIX C. LINEAR PROGRAMMING FOR PHASE III 
The Influence in Afghanistan Game’s Mathematical Calculations 
Phase III 
The Coalition’s Payoffs Division 
As in phase II, let us assume that the decision variables are X1, X2, and X3, and 
are defined as follows: 
X1= India, and the unilateral game value for X1 is V(X1) = 9 
X2=Iran, and the unilateral game value for X2 is V(X2) = 10 
X3= Pakistan, and the unilateral game value for X3 is V(X3) = 10. 
 
 
Table 22.   Coalition Structures and Payoffs 
Let us assume that we have the function Z, which describes the possible 
coalitions’ payoffs from the previous game, where Z (Xi) = V (Xi). The function Z is 
subject to the following constraints shown below.  
V(X1+X2+X3) =16 
V(X1+X2) = 11 
V(X2+X3) = 13 
V(X1+X3) = 8 
V(X1) < = 9 
V(X2) < = 10 





To find the maximum payoffs the players can get under the previous constraints, 
we need to find the maximum value of the function Zi, (Max. Zi) for all Xi, where i=1, 2, 
3, which represents the coalitions’ payoffs. The coalition description according to the 
function Z is illustrated below: 
• Z1 represents - the ideal coalition Z1(X1+X2+X3) =V(X1+X2+X3) 
• Z2 represents - India and Iran coalition against Pakistan, where Z2(X1+X2) 
= V(X1+X2) 
• Z3 represents - Iran and Pakistan coalition against India, where Z3(X2+X3) 
=V(X2+X3) 
• Z4 represents - India and Pakistan coalition against Iran, where Z4(X1+ X3) 


























































































Table 23.   The Coalition’s Payoffs Division Among the Three RCP 
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